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The paper explores the e↵ect of weather shocks on wage growth, using quarterly
data on a large sample of US counties for the 1990-2006 period. We find a robust and
significant e↵ect of extreme weather events on private wages, a result not previously
established for a developed country. The e↵ect of weather on wages also varies depend-
ing on the type of shock considered: whereas extreme cold events and rainfall shocks
have a negative impact on wages, extreme warm temperatures appear to have the
opposite e↵ect. In order to shed light on this peculiar pattern we exploits di↵erences
across sectors and also study to what extent weather shocks are linked to the agri-
cultural dependence and the financial development of a given county. Weather shocks
a↵ect positively wages only in sectors with non-tradable goods. Agricultural depen-
dence is an important factor to explain the negative impact of cold events, whereas
financial development fuels wage-growth in case of warm events.
JEL Classification: Q54; E24; J24;O44.
Keywords: climate; labor productivity; weather shocks; United States.
⇤PhD Candidate at the Department of Economics and Finance at LUISS Guido Carli University and
Research Fellow at the Center of Economics and International Studies (CEIS) of Tor Vergata University.
I am indebted to Fabiano Schivardi for his precious guidance. I am extremely grateful to Paola Giuliano
for her support and suggestions and to Luigi Pistaferri for his advices. I would like to thank also for their
helpful comments Alexandra D’Onofrio, Pierluigi Murro, Daniel Osberghaus, all participants to the World
Conference of Environmental and Resource Economics in Istanbul, to the conference ”Climate shock and
household behaviour” at the World Conference of Enviromental and Resource Economics, at the German
Institute for Economic Research (DIW) in Berlin and to the seminar at LUISS. All errors remain mine.
2
1. Introduction
According to IPCC (2013), during the last decade extreme weather events were more
and more frequent and the period 1983-2012 was the warmest 30-years period of the last 14
centuries. This phenomenon obviously determined a growing interest on climate-related
issues.1In this framework, the literature started to investigate the future cost of climate
change for the human society. The first studies on growth and climate were focusing on
the link between weather and income employing cross-sectional dataset, such as Sachs and
Warner (1997), Gallup et al. (1999) and Dell et al. (2009). However, works such as Ace-
moglu et al. (2002) and Rodrik et al. (2004) argued that the correlation between weather
realizations and income is spurious and driven by omitted controls, as for example the
missing identification of the institutional framework or other social norms. Reconciling
the literature through a panel dataset at country-level, Dell et al. (2012) recently reopened
the debate demonstrating that year-to-year fluctuations in temperature and precipitation
have a large negative e↵ect on growth but only in poor countries, suggesting that being
poor is highly correlated with a substantial negative temperature e↵ect. Dell et al. (2012)
explain that in these countries weather’s e↵ect is consistent and broad and it a↵ects also
agricultural output, industrial output and political stability. The authors, however, do not
establish any significant result for developed countries. Several positive or negative factors
could drive this non-finding, as for example an higher level of resilience and adaptation
typical of developed countries but also the type of weather data employed, the temporal
dimension of the observations, and the specification used. This is why this paper provides
an analysis on the e↵ect of weather focusing on daily extreme events.
In this framework, the final purpose of this study is to investigate the e↵ect of weather
shocks on intra-county labor income growth in US during the period 1990-2006 using quar-
terly data. Exploiting daily weather observations, and combining them with quarterly
labor wage in private sector, it is shown that weather influences significantly average daily
wage. Di↵erently from previous studies, which usually focused only on temperature and
precipitation trends2, this paper shows that increasing the frequency of observation (daily
for weather and quarterly for wage), it is possible to demonstrate that climate e↵ectively
interacts with the economic environment. This result is not in contradiction with previous
studies, conversely it supplies evidence of the e↵ect of extreme realizations against the
common used average yearly values of temperature as in Dell et al. (2012). This finding
is obtained concentrating on a smaller geographical level (county) than previous ones in
the literature (i.e. country-level) also in order to reduce the dispersion of weather-related
1As defined in works such as Dell et al. (2014), climate refers to the overall distribution of outcomes
such as temperature and rainfall, while weather describes the realizations from the climate distribution.
2Also because of the complexity of finding weather data with high frequency.
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information caused by the high spatial variability of the phenomenon itself. In addition,
as IPCC (2013) points out, apart from a trend e↵ect, climate change is also determining
an increase in the likelihood of weather shocks, defined in this paper as extreme events
outside the historical distribution in a particular geographical zone. Thus, it would be
necessary to extend the knowledge of climate change outside the classical trend e↵ect, in
order also to capture all the complexity of the phenomenon that we are facing. For exam-
ple, average precipitation during a year is not informative of the intra-year distribution
of the precipitation itself, and the same mean value could be determined both by a linear
homogeneous distribution or by few and localized extreme events alternated with a long
period of drought. Employment of average data disregards the possibility to depict all the
e↵ects of weather and this, added to the increasing likelihood of weather shocks, could
determine an underestimation of the cost of climate change in the future. This paper
finds an heterogeneity behind the e↵ect of weather and, exploiting sectoral data, it shows
that the general result hides a story of winners and losers, where some industries with a
higher degree of climate-sensitiveness are negative correlated with the shocks and, con-
trary, fewer industries are gaining from the increasing variability. This is compatible with
Gra↵ Zivin and Neidell (2014) who suggest that the e↵ect of weather on time-allocation
is heterogeneous depending on whether the sector is climate-exposed or not. We obtain
all these estimates using average daily sectoral labor wage supplied by the US Bureau of
Economic Analysis and defining weather shocks as the occurrence of a two-days weather
record outside the 99.9% historical confidence band of weather realizations in the county3.
To be consistent with the adopted definition of extreme events, We calculate shocks on
maximum/minimum temperature and on total precipitation. The need of daily data ob-
servations for weather realization during the historical period (1980q1-1989q4), combined
with the high-propensity of switching-o↵ weather stations as explained by Au↵hammer
et al. (2013), reduce the base sample to an unbalanced panel of 1935 US counties and
weather stations, 12 sectors, for a total of 720,196 observations. In spite of this, di↵erent
tests have been conducted considering only a balanced sub-sample and in general the re-
sults can be considered consistent and robust.
Following the cross-country literature, the study then supplies one of the first within-
country evidence, especially for a developed country, that weather shocks a↵ect signifi-
cantly and heterogeneously daily wages and thus labor productivity. We test the estimates
obtained focusing on some channels of heterogeneity considered relevant in the develop-
ment and climate-related literature. Particularly, this study focuses on three dimensions
that could a↵ect the heterogeneity of the shocks: agricultural-dependence, level of trad-
ability of the sectors and financial development of the county. Agricultural-dependence
3The historical period refers to the decade 1980q1-1989q4.
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has a role only in case of shocks on minimum temperature, while it does not appear to
drive elasticities of income to weather in case of rainfall or maximum temperature shocks.
The level of tradability of the goods in the sectors seems to be a primary factor of the
propagation of weather shocks, indeed all the negative e↵ects of extreme events are con-
centrated on the industries defined as more tradable. Finally, contrary to the development
literature, financial development appears to fuel wage growth during shock on maximum
temperature but it has no role in mitigating the e↵ect of negative shocks. This could mean
that even if agents have the possibility to smooth they actually do not follow this strategy.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces the related literature; section 3 in-
cludes data description with their methodology and sources; section 4 presents summary
statistics; section 5 shows the results of the empirical analysis and discusses it; section
6 addresses the heterogeneity of these e↵ects; section 7 develops some robustness check;
section 8 outlines conclusions and section 9 contains Appendix and tables.
2. Related Literature
The main contribution of the present study is related to the climate-economics litera-
ture, as recently defined by Dell et al. (2014). Part of this literature addresses the question
whether income is a↵ected by climate environment using cross-sectional samples. Their
general finding is that warm countries and regions are less rich than cold ones. This is the
case, for example, of Gallup et al. (1999), who show how countries located between the
two tropics have on average a 1% smaller yearly growth-rate with respect to other coun-
tries. From a panel data perspective, Dell et al. (2012) demonstrate that poor countries
experience a drop in per capita income of 1.4% when their temperature increases of 1 C.
Additionally, they show that climate has an influence also on the agricultural, industrial
and political output4. They conclude that while it is plausible that this negative shift
is driven by an agricultural channel, it is also possible that temperature plays its role
through other dimensions, such as political stability. Their findings are not significant
for rich countries, and this is compatible with the hypothesis that advanced economies
are less vulnerable or more resilient to weather trends. Narrowing the time-dimensional
and geographical-dimensional level of the analysis, we add novel evidence on the e↵ect of
weather on wage in US, which is one of the richest country in the world.
Other works investigate the e↵ect of weather events on income realization for single sec-
tors, focusing on the labor productivity channel. As demonstrated in the medical litera-
4Other paper studies the weather e↵ects on several output, for analysis on agricultural the impact of
weather, gdp loss and farmers behavior see De Giorgi and Pistaferri (2013), Deschenes and Greenstone
(2007), Fisher et al. (2012), Schlenker and Lobell (2010); for evidence on aggregate outputs see Jones and
Olken (2010).
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ture, extreme daily temperature and rainfall cause fatigue5 and thus weather could have
an important role in determining labor productivity. This is usually shown employing
observational and experimental data, conducted through experiments on productivity of
factory, call center and o ce workers. For example, Niemela et al. (2002) show that an
increase in temperature by 1  C outside the normal temperature zone cause a reduction
of about 1.8% on workers’ labor productivity. Other laboratory experiments emphasize
that productivity of individuals could decline when the temperature passes 25-30 C  or
goes above a certain threshold. Our findings are compatible with this literature, but they
adds novel evidence about the heterogeneity of the e↵ect on 12 di↵erent sectors.
Finally, this paper gives empirical support on the possible channels and mechanism hidden
behind the e↵ect of weather on average income. A recent study by Gra↵ Zivin and Neidell
(2014) shows that during an extreme hot or cold day, a worker could prefer to allocate
time to leisure activity instead of working, to stay at home or to work instead of enjoying
outside activities. Their results display a negative e↵ect of extreme heat on time allocated
to labor in climate-exposed industries (defined as high risk), with the occurrence of tem-
perature over 37 C  associated to a statistically significant drop of 59 minutes in labor
activity. Gra↵ Zivin and Neidell (2014) thus give a first insight on the heterogeneous e↵ect
of weather depending on the exposition to climate of the sector considered. The present
paper, after disentangling by sectors, investigates the role of agriculture, tradability and
financial development in fostering the shocks’ propagation to overall economy.
To the best of our knowledge, in the literature there is not a comprehensive study that
estimates the cost of happening of extreme weather events in terms of wage for several
sectors at sub-national level in case of developed country.
3. Data source
3.1 Weather data
The analysis employs records of climate variables from weather stations data drawn
from the National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) Global Historical Climatology Network-
Daily (GHCN-Daily). This platform provides one of the most complete database of daily
climate summaries from land surface stations located all over the world. Following Barreca
et al. (2013), we select as explanatory variables the daily maximum/minimum temper-
ature and total daily precipitation. Using both maximum and minimum temperature is
necessary for identifying eventual shocks on the extreme of temperature records. Indeed,
in case of employment of average values it would be challenging to capture the occurrence
5For evidence on cognitive and productivity performance see Epstein et al. (1980), Ramsey (1995),
Hancock, Ross, and Szalma (2007), Pilcher, Nadler, and Busch (2002).
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of extreme events because they could moderately a↵ect the overall average, especially if
measured during long periods of time (such as years). In this sense, we propose a dif-
ferent identification of climate fluctuations using daily data and exploiting an alternative
dimension of weather. Once excluded weather stations with missing daily values for the
historical period (1980q1-1989q4), remaining stations are merged with counties that con-
tain them. Realization of this one-to-one match between counties and stations is necessary
for several reasons. Firstly, the study needs daily records in order to be consistent with
the definition of weather shock adopted, that is the occurrence of minimum two-day last-
ing climate records outside the 99.9% confidence interval of historical counties’ average.
Employing station data allows to avoid interpolation of more than 10 millions of records
from di↵erent stations that have few records for each year. A recent survey on the usage of
climate data from Au↵hammer et al. (2013) suggests deriving data for missing stations re-
gressing their records from non-missing stations. However, because of the extreme spatial
variability of weather data and the quantity of stations missing in the dataset, predicting
missing records from other stations could bias the results at least as not including them.
Furthermore, being this analysis focused on the intra-county variation of labor income in
response to weather shocks, the temporal dimension should be the priority, and in order
to verify a possible bias we test the results in the robustness section.
The methodology requires the identification of the occurrence of record outliers. Once
identified, we use the outliers to generate quarterly dummies on positive maximum tem-
perature shocks, negative minimum temperature shocks, and precipitation shocks. The
identification of weather shocks is based on the calculation, for each county, of the average
and standard deviations of maximum/minimum temperature and total precipitation in
each season for the historical period (1980q1-1989q4), where the seasons are set as co-
incident to 1st quarter, 2nd quarter, 3rd quarter, 4th quarter. For example, we define
the average of maximum temperature during the first season in a county as the county’s
historical maximum temperature of all the first quarters in the historical sample (1980q1-
1989q1). Then, we set a dummy equal to one for that county if during a first quarter of the
period under analysis there are two consecutive observations outside the 99.9% confidence
interval of its seasonal historical average.
Thus, in order to set the shock at county-quarter level, we set a di↵erent confidence inter-
val for each quarter (season) and each county in order to identify quarter’s outliers. This
helps also in avoiding to consider as shocks just, for example, extremely high realizations
during summer and extremely low realizations during winter. In addition, we consider
the county’s average because each geographical unit has its own experience with the local
weather. It is straightforward that an extreme event in San Diego is totally di↵erent from
another event in New York, where usually negative weather events are more severe. This
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methodology accounts for this di↵erence, creating a county-specific measure for the shock.
3.2 Labor income data
Data on quarterly labor wage are delivered by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) on county and quarterly basis starting from 1990q1 for public and private sectors.
Data are available for twelve industry supersectors following NAICS 1992 classification
(North American Industry Classification System). For each quarter, BEA supplies total
labor wage, employment, and average weekly labor wage in a quarter. This paper keeps
only data from private industries and it hypothesizes that each day contributes equiva-
lently to the average weekly labor wage. Thus, we derive the average daily labor wage in
a quarter dividing the average weekly labor wage by seven. Finally, data on wages are
deflated using BEA Consumer Price Index.
3.3 Other data
Data on population are available at year level from BEA. We impute a linear popu-
lation growth rate within the year in order to predict the value at quarterly level. This
is done in order to maintain the original time-period of the wage for the final-sample.
Dummies on the occurrence of hurricanes are created at state-year level for all the hurri-
canes listed by Strobl (2011). We decide to create this variable at state-year level for two
reasons: first, because of the di culty of finding an entire list of counties hit by hurricanes
and, second, because the happening of an hurricane in a small group of counties could
however influence the economy of the whole state, through aid for recovering from the
damages.
In the second part of the paper we explore the heterogeneity of shocks’ e↵ects, focusing
also on some dimensions considered significant by the climate-economics literature. First,
the analysis tests the level of agricultural-dependence of the county itself as a mechanism
of shock propagation. As Dell et al. (2012) emphasize in case of developing countries,
if agriculture has a crucial role in the economy of a county it would be possible that
the weather would a↵ect more the income of that county. For this reason we employ a
variable that reports the fraction of area covered by cropland in each county. This value
is provided by Ramankutty and Foley (1999), it is extracted using GIS (Geographical
Information System) and it is employed to explore whether the e↵ect of shocks changes
increasing the agricultural area inside a county.
A second channel is the tradability of the goods in the sectors. As Gra↵ Zivin and
Neidell (2014) point out, the level of exposure to climate could influence the e↵ect of
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weather on the individual time-allocation choice. For this reason, we exploit the concept
of tradabilty of goods dividing the sample in two clusters 6: non-tradable industries (or
low-tradable) and high-tradable industries. High-tradable cluster includes Construction,
Good-Producing, Manufacturing, Trade and Transportation, while the non-tradable one
comprises Education and Health, Financial Activities, Other Services, Professional Ser-
vices, Service Providing.
The third channel explored is the level of financial development of the county during the
whole period (1990q1-2006q4). The intuition is that in counties with higher financial de-
velopment we expect that shocks will be smoothed by the higher possibility of borrowing.
For this purpose, data on the number of banks and saving institutions are extracted for
each year from Censtats, that is a platform supplying also records at county level col-
lected by the US Census Bureau. The number of banks and saving institutions are then
divided by the population and thus the final sample is treated at year-level, and not at
quarterly-level as in the previous analysis.
4. Summary and descriptive statistics
Figure 1 displays the spatial distribution of weather stations selected from NCDC’s
dataset that have non-missing values for the historical period (1980q1-1989q4). It is pos-
sible to notice a higher concentration of weather stations on the east coast than on the
west one, mainly because there are more missing values (station switched o↵) in the last
one. Therefore, the final sample contains only 1935 counties out of the 3143 of which US is
composed. As Au↵hammer et al. (2013) explain in their work, it is common that stations
are switched o↵ after brief periods or that frequently they do not record all the climate
variables. This is however not correlated with the weather-shock events, even because it is
unlikely that shocks constrain stations to be switched o↵ and so the analysis can proceed
without any issue of sample selection. Table 1 shows summary statistics for historical and
sample’s weather variables. While during 1980q1-1989q4 maximum temperature was on
average 18.48  C, the mean value of the period 1990q1-2006q1 is 18.66  C, with an in-
crease of 0.18  C between the two periods. There was a slight positive shift also in average
tmin, passing from 5.92  C degree during 1980q1-1989q4 to 6.34  C during 1990q1-2006q4.
This occurred also in average daily precipitation during a quarter, that passed from 2.55
average mm of precipitation to 2.67 mm. Standard deviation for all the variables reported
is also higher during the period in analysis than in the historical one, highlighting once
again the higher volatility of the weather during last decade. Table 2 reports the main
weather explanatory variables, i.e. the frequency of climate shocks with the associated
6Here I exclude some sector because of the unknown tradabilty of the goods and services produced.
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standard deviation. Quarters with negative temperature show the higher frequency, equal
to 0.28, followed by rainfall shocks with 0.16 and positive temperature shocks with 0.03.
These results indicate that weather shocks in US are more frequent on the occurrence
of extreme negative events, such as cold temperature and extreme days of rainfall, and
this is coherent with Lobell et al. (2011). Note that, applying this methodology, counties
that received a shock in a certain quarter are considered as treated, and thus previous
statistics represent the fraction of the sample hit by the shocks. These di↵erences in fre-
quencies among the weather realizations, especially the high value of negative and rainfall
shocks, are explained both by the changing climate during last thirty years7, as well as the
uncertain distribution of climate, which is an open debate in the literature. This is the
reason why the robustness section addresses this issue using di↵erent specifications for the
weather variable. The final part of Table 2 displays summary statistics for total shocks
per quarter. The maximum number of tmax shocks inside a quarter is 30, while for tmin
and rainfall they are respectively 42 and 10.
[Insert Table 1 and Table 2 here]
Table 3 shows summary statistics for average daily real-wage in the 12 sectors un-
der study. Wage is deflated using CPI 2006 for the purpose of comparing data from
1990 to 2006. Sectoral real wage is higher in Manufacturing, characterized also by the
second-higher standard deviation. Information and Good Producing are the second and
the third more remunerative sectors. Conversely, Leisure and Hospitality experiences the
lower average labor income during all the period. Figure 2 shows the spatial distribution
of daily wages averaged by all the sector and quarters. Labor wage is highly concentrated
in counties belonging to big cities, as New York and Boston in north-east, Houston in the
south, Los Angeles and Las Vegas in the south-west, and Chicago in the north-east. A
zone of low labor income can be identified in the center of US, where big cities are few
and industrial activities are less developed.
Lower panel of Table 3 shows the summary statistics for the variable employed in the het-
erogeneity section and other controls. Mean fraction of area harvested in all the sample
is equal to 0.35, indicating that on average 35% of each county’s territory is covered by
cropland, while the index of bank per capita (multiplied by 100 for calculation purpose)
is available only for 180,415 observations, with a mean of 0.042 and standard deviation
equal to 0.025. Finally, log of population has an average of 10.60, while the average for
the hurricane dummy is 0.03, meaning that 3% of the sample experienced an hurricane
during the period under analysis.
7As explained by Lobell et al. (2011) for the period 1980-2008
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Figure 3 reports an example of the method employed for identifying the shock for a random
county during 2000q3. The green line represents the mean value of maximum temperature
for the 3rd quarter during 1980q1-1989q4 for that county, while the red line is the upper
bound of the confidence interval at 99.9% level. Notice that for the maximum temperature
we consider only the upper bound while for negative temperature we use only the lower
bound. Red dots are two couples of consecutive records outside the 99.9% confidence
interval that are classified as shock, while blue dots are observations inside the confidence
bands. Therefore, in this case the dummy variable on maximum temperature will take
value 1 for the study of the extensive margin. In addition, a second variable identifying
the total positive temperature shocks will assume value 2 for the study of the intensive
margin. Note that, independently from the classification criteria chosen, during the third
quarter in figure an anomaly in the weather distribution is identifiable around the daily
observations that here are classified as a shock. This can be determined only using this
non-linear methodology, that captures the occurrence of such events under dummy vari-
ables.
[Insert Table 3 here]
In figure 4 we exploit average daily temperature excursion, calculated as the di↵erence
between the average maximum temperature and the average minimum temperature in
each county for the period 1990q1-2006q4. This measure is plot in the figure with the
natural logarithm of average labor income. Figure 4 shows that counties with higher daily
temperature excursion experience the lower labor income. An increase of 1 degree in daily
excursion is associated to a decline of 4% on average quarterly income and the correlation
is significant at 1% level. Obviously the correlation could be spurious, also for his cross-
county dimension, and several factors could determine it, as for instance property right
institutions8.
5. Empirical analysis
To capture the e↵ect of weather shocks on intra-county labor income growth, and fol-
lowing convergence theory as in Strobl (2011), the main model fitted is a county, sector,
and quarterly fixed e↵ects OLS model with standard errors clustered at state-industry
level. We cluster the errors at state-industry level because of two reasons. First, sectoral
wage needs to be correlated because of global demand and supply factors. Indeed without
8For evidence on the debate about the importance of geographic or institutional factors see Acemoglu
et al. (2002) and Sach (2003)
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clustering, an increase in global demand or supply for an industry could bias the estimates
of the standard errors. Second, considering that climate has a high spatial dimension, it
is necessary to correct standard errors for eventual spatial correlation. The sample is
an unbalanced panel and the correlation matrix for the spatial-error model should vary
togheter with the variation of the number of counties during each quarter. However, this is
computational demanding. Thus, in order to partially address this issue, we cluster errors
also at state level so that this spatial correlation could be taken into account at least for
the counties not located on the border. Fixed e↵ects are another relevant instrument for
the analysis of intra-county variation since they capture latitude, longitude, elevation and
other spatial controls used in the cross-sectional literature9. In addition, since character-
istics such as race, education or gender-ratio have small variability between-quarters, the
likelihood that their variation corresponds to the occurrence of weather shocks is extremely
low. The empirical model is tested using quarterly dummies because, together with the
sector fixed-e↵ects, they capture the intra-year cyclicality of labor wage for specific sec-
tors (for instance in the sector of Leisure and Hospitality). Furthermore, they address the
e↵ect of business cycle, including economic shocks that could impact on the whole sample
at the same time. Finally, we employ the natural logarithm of labor wage in order to
estimate the coe cients as percentage changes in wage. The following model of county’s
income process encompasses all these characteristics:
lnwc,s,q =  0 +  1lnwc,s,q 1 +  2 tmaxc,q +  3 tminc,q +  4 precc,q+
⇡q + µc + ⇣s +  Xc,q + ✏s,i
(1)
Where  0 is the constant, lnwc,s,q is the natural logarithm of average daily labor wage
in sector s, for county c, during quarter q; lnwc,s,q 1 is the natural logarithm of previous
quarter labor wage for the same county;  tmax,  tmin, and  prec are dummies taking
value 1 if in that quarter there are minimum two consecutive records outside the 99.9%
confidence interval of their historical average; Xc,q is a matrix of controls (i.e. population
growth rate and hurricane dummy); ⇡q are quarterly dummies; ⇣s sector fixed-e↵ects; µc
are counties fixed-e↵ects; ✏ is an error term clustered at sector s by state i level. Be-
fore introducing the results, one caveat should be made. Regressing on a lagged variable
could bias the estimation of the coe cients, as established by Nickell (1981). The author
points out, however, that the bias goes to zero as the time dimension increases. Our
panel contains on average more than 29 observations per group (and a maximum of 67).
9As the controls employed in Dell et al. (2009).
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Additionally, in the robustness section the analysis is conducted reducing the panel to a
balanced one and keeping only counties with the larger number of consecutive observations.
5.1 Extensive margin: shock or not?
Table 4 reports the results on the extensive margin, where we control only for the e↵ect
of the presence of weather shocks independently from the number of the events itself. The
baseline specification includes sector, counties and quarterly FE. In column 1, wage is
regressed only on positive/negative temperature and precipitation shocks, and the result
is that average daily wage in a quarter decrease by -0.2% when rainfall shocks are present
during the quarter. We calculate these estimates without fitting any control and they are
significant at 1%. In column 2 we include the first lag of daily wage for the same id. The
result of the presence of rainfall shocks is quite consistent with previous estimation. The
extreme events on precipitation influences the average daily wage in a quarter by -0.1%.
Interestingly, in column 2 extreme events on maximum temperature have also an e↵ect on
wages, but this e↵ect is positive and equal to +0.4%. In column 3 the total dimension of
the population in the county is added among the controls, but it is lagged in order to avoid
any correlation with the change in employment. The estimates in column 3 remain quite
consistent with previous ones: a quarter with positive shocks experiences, on average, an
increase in wages equal to +0.4%, with a significant coe cient at 1% level. Also in case
of rainfall shocks in a quarter the coe cient is stable and significant at 10% level, with an
e↵ect of -0.1% on wage. Finally, in column 4 we fit the same model adding a dummy that
controls for the happening of hurricanes at state-level for a certain year. The consistency
of the estimate is not a↵ected by this control, and the coe cient remains significant and
stable, with a small increase on the e↵ect of positive shocks, that reaches a value of +0.5%.
Summarizing, in the extensive margin it is evident that positive temperature and rain-
fall shocks have an e↵ect on wage growth, but while this e↵ect is positive for maximum
temperature, it is negative in case of precipitation shocks. Minimum temperature does
not appear to influence the wage growth path of the overall economy. However, from
Table 4 it is not possible to exclude that weather variables have an heterogeneous impact
on di↵erent industries, hitting di↵erently each sector depending on their climate exposure.
Analyzing only the extensive margin could determine a good estimation for a study that
aims to sum-up the e↵ect of climate, but it would underestimate the actual role of the
shocks, that could be to exacerbate inter-sectoral di↵erences. This is the reason why,
after studying the intensive margin, we proceed investigating the role of weather shocks
in a↵ecting wage growth sector by sector.
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[Insert Table 4 here]
5.2 Intensive margin: the e↵ect of one more shock
Table 5 displays the intensive margin of the e↵ect of weather shocks in the data, where
the main covariates are the total number of shocks in a county for each quarter and the
dependent variable is the average daily wage in a quarter. As in Table 4, column 1 reports
the e↵ect of weather shocks without fitting any controls. The result is that when there is
an increase of one shock on tmax, the average daily wage in that quarter has a positive
growth equal to +0.1%. The same e↵ect in magnitude, but di↵erent in sign (-0.1%),
takes place when there is one more shock in precipitation in a quarter with respect to the
quarter before. In column 2 we report the results obtained adding the lagged value of
wage to the specification of column 1. While previous estimates for rainfall and maximum
temperature remain consistent, it is interesting to note that also minimum temperature
appears to have a small e↵ect on wages, with a coe cient equal to -0.03% significant at 10
% level. In column 3 we add also the lagged value of the population in the county and the
coe cients of the three shock variables remain consistent. Finally, adding a dummy on the
hurricanes does not modify the estimation, with the coe cients of maximum temperature
shocks (+0.1%), minimum temperature (-0.04%), and rainfall shocks (-0.1%) remaining
stable and significant. Note that the value of the daily wage derives from the BEA’s
calculation of average weekly wage in a quarter, which is divided by 7 assuming that each
day contributes equally to the average daily wage. Furthermore, also BEA calculates the
original average weekly wage by averaging total quarterly wage on the number of weeks
present in a quarter. Thus, considering that on average a quarter is composed by 64
working days, we can assume that each day contributes to the quarterly realization in
a percentage of around 1.56%. Then, if the hypothesis is correct, the occurrence of one
shock on maximum temperature in a quarter has the e↵ect of increasing the labor wage by
0.1%/1.56%, corresponding to a shift of +6.41% on the daily productivity. For the same
reason, in case of an increase of one shock on rainfall the daily productivity diminish by -
6.41%. Finally, the presence of one more shock in minimum temperature causes a negative
shift on labor productivity of -2.56%. This estimate supplies evidence of the potential role
that climate change could have in influencing average productivity in a developed country,
but does not gives insights about the potential heterogeneous e↵ect that weather may have
on di↵erent sectors of the economy.
[Insert Table 5 here]
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5.3 Sectoral Analysis: winners and losers?
Understanding which is the sector more a↵ected by weather in terms of private wage
could provide insights for implementing specific policies to tackle its higher vulnerability,
measured as entity of the shock over average wage. For this reason Table 6 disentangles the
e↵ect of weather shocks at sectoral level. The sectoral daily wage in a quarter is regressed
using specification 4 of Table 5. Thus, the model includes counties FE, quarterly FE, the
lagged natural log of wages, the lagged level of population and a dummy at state-year
level if an hurricane hit the state in that year. The main covariates are once again the
total number of shocks in the quarter, thus the estimates reported in Table 6 refer to the
e↵ect of the increase of 1 shock in the total number of shocks during the quarter for which
average daily wage is reported.
According to Gra↵ Zivin and Neidell (2014), the sectors that are more exposed to weather
should be also the more negatively a↵ected by the occurrence of extreme events. This
is the case of Construction, where the increase of 1 shock on minimum temperature or
in rainfall causes a decrease on average daily wages of -0.2%, with the the coe cients
significant at 1%. Also the super-sector including Education and Health has a decline in
private wage in case of one rainfall shock, with the entity of the negative shift equal to
-0.2% and significant at 1% level. This decline could correspond to the so-called ”snow-
day”, term that is used by the municipalities in US when the schools and the public o ces
closed during extreme precipitation events. A third sector exposed with severity to weather
shocks is Leisure and Hospitality, which experiences both a positive and a negative e↵ect.
Indeed its wage increases by +0.5% when there is one more shock on positive temperature,
and it declines by -0.1% when the shock is on minimum temperature. We conjecture that
the positive e↵ect of a shock on maximum temperature could be driven by an increase
in the demand of good and services for Leisure and Hospitality. Gra↵ Zivin and Neidell
(2014) demonstrate that in case of a positive shift in temperature the individuals tend to
allocate more time to the external activities and this could be connected with an increase
in the demand for good and services and in the wages of workers in the private sector.
Other sectors such as Manufacturing10 and Natural Resources are a↵ected by extreme
events, with the first one experiencing a decrease of -0.1% in wage in case of shock on
minimum temperature, and the second one having a negative shift of -0.4% in case of
shock on rainfall. Furthermore, the occurrence of a shock on negative temperature seems
to a↵ect negatively also Other Services (-0.05%) and Trade and Transportation (-0.1%),
while rainfall shock has a negative e↵ect also on Service Providing (-0.1%).
All results reported here could be expected because of the degree of exposition to weather of
each sector itself. However, there is a surprising result that gives new insight on the e↵ect of
10This sector could be considered as climate exposed because of some external operation.
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weather on wages, evident in Table 6. Indeed, two sectors, which are not climate exposed,
are positively correlated with extreme events. This is the case of the Financial Activities
and Professional Services. In the first one the occurrence of a positive or negative shock
on temperature brings an increase of respectively +0.02% and +0.01% in wage. In the
second one the presence of one shock on maximum temperature determines a positive shift
on wages equal to +0.1%. The result on Financial Activities could be explained because
this sector includes also insurance activities, which are likely to increase revenues during
periods with extreme events since people tend to cope with risk buying more insurance.
Conversely, a conjecture for the e↵ect of shocks on maximum temperature in these sectors
is the increase in demand in Leisure and Hospitality, which could have a spillover e↵ects
on Financial Activities (e.g. more insurance for traveling, more bank movements) and on
Professional Services.
[Insert Table 6 here]
Summing up, while from an overall perspective only maximum temperature and rainfall
shocks appear to have an influence on wages (as in Table 4), once the analysis is conducted
in each sector, 10 sectors out of 12 are influenced heterogeneously by the occurrence of
extreme events, included shocks on minimum temperature. The heterogeneity of the e↵ect
of weather shocks create small winners (such as Financial Activities, Professional Services
and Leisure and Hospitality in case of positive temperature shocks) and big losers (as
Construction, Education and Health, Manufacturing, Natural Resources, Other Services,
Services Providing, and Trade and Transportation).
5.4 Sectoral daily impact of shocks
Table 7 gives an insight of the monetary cost of weather shocks in US economy. Indeed,
Table 7 displays the e↵ect of a shocks on weather as % of daily wage for each sector (column
1) and it focuses on the value of the event expressed in real USD 2006 (column 2). Then,
in column 3 we calculate the maximum predicted cost/revenue from shocks for the county
with the largest number of shocks. As in section 5.2, I apply the following methodology:
%dailywage =  s ⇤ 1
totdays q
⇤ 100 (2)
where   is the coe cient calculated in Table 6 for sector s and totdays is the number
of working days in a quarter, which is assumed to be equal to 64. In column 2, using
the sectoral average daily wage, we determine for each sector the value in dollar of the
percentage in column 1. In column 3 we multiply the value in dollars for the maximum
number of shocks (and by type of shock) in a quarter for all the dataset.
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As Table 7 shows, the highest cost of the happening of a rainfall shock is associated to
Natural Resource, which experiences a drop of -25.64% in daily productivity, equal to
10.63 dollars. In this case, the highest predicted value of shocks for the quarter with more
extreme events is equal to 308.27 USD. The second sector most a↵ected is Construction,
with drops equal to 12.82% in daily wage both for a shock on minimum temperature and
in rainfall, and where the maximum predicted cost of these shocks is equal respectively to
231 and 159.5 USD. Also Education and Health and Manufacturing have consistent losses
and in the worst case they are above 130 USD per quarters.
Turning to the positive e↵ects of the shocks, which are listed in the last part of Table 6,
Leisure and Hospitality is the sector with the highest positive elasticity to the occurrence
of extreme events on maximum temperature. Indeed, the occurrence of a shock on positive
temperature increases the daily wage on average of 32.05%, with a maximum predicted
net e↵ect equal to 149.1 USD which compensates largely the negative e↵ect of a shock
on minimum temperature in the same sector (which has a maximum predicted value of
-41.75 USD). Financial Activities and Professional Services are the other sectors receiving
a positive e↵ect from shocks on weather, but these impacts are restrained to less than 20
dollars per quarter in case of maximum predicted value (column 3). However, Financial
Activities and Professional services could be strengthened by weather shocks because the
occurrence of extreme events will increase the di↵erential between their average wage and
that of the other sectors, pushing up the wage inequality among sectors.
6. Heterogeneity
This section investigates the heterogeneity of the e↵ect of weather shocks and the mech-
anisms of transmission of these to the economy. Collecting data from di↵erent sources,
we focus in particular on the role of agricultural-dependence of the county in influencing
the e↵ect of extreme events on private wage of the county itself; on the tradable and
non-tradable nature of the sectors and on the financial development level of the county.
6.1 Agricultural-dependence
During the occurrence of an extreme event, several dimensions could determine a shift
in the normal growth path of wages in private sector. A factor could be the presence of
a strong agricultural sector. This, being the most directly interested by weather shocks,
would facilitate the impact on average income. Such channel has been hypothesized also
by Dell et al. (2012) who have found a strong e↵ect of climate on GDP’s of developing
countries with a large agricultural value added. On this purpose, after having averaged
the variable on fraction of area harvested at county level for the period 1990q1-2006q4,
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this work tests if the e↵ect of weather shocks changes when the area dedicated to cropland
increases. In Figure 5 we fit a specification similar to column 4 of Table 5, with only
state FE in place of the county FE, using a rolling strategy. As it is possible to notice
from Figure 5, moving toward a sample with more area harvested does not influence the
impact of shocks on wage, which is positively influenced by a shift of tmax shocks only
in the middle of the graph. Thus, for what concerns maximum temperature the result
confirms that there is not a direct link between cropland (i.e. agriculture) and private
wages growth. In Figure 6 we conduct the same exercise with a di↵erent result. Indeed, in
this case a variation of shocks on minimum temperature decreases wage when the fraction
of area harvested passes the threshold of 0.6-0.7. This implies that the e↵ect of shocks on
minimum temperature is negative and significant when the fraction of area harvested is
high. Thus, we establish a link between minimum temperature, agriculture and average
private wage that is new in the literature for developed countries. In case of extreme
events, also in developed countries (minimum) temperature shocks pass plausibly through
the agricultural sector and a↵ect the rest of the economy. In Figure 7 the same analysis is
conducted for the precipitation shocks but in this case the result is not pointing towards
an agricultural channel, considered that the e↵ect of shocks on income is significant only
at low level of fraction or area harvested (area<0.2).
6.2 Tradable vs non-tradable
The nature of the goods produced and sold in the market could also increase the like-
lihood that an extreme weather realization would a↵ect the wages in private sector. In
case of sector producing tradable goods, they should be more exposed to climate in gen-
eral and thus to shocks. The concept of tradable and non-tradable goods is not far from
the classification of climate-exposed developed by Gra↵ Zivin and Neidell (2014). Di↵er-
ently from them, we exclude some sectors such as Leisure and Hospitality and Natural
Resource because they are heavily climate-exposed but not easily identifiable as tradable.
Consequently, the definition of sectors with tradable goods includes Construction, Good-
Producing, Manufacturing, Trade and Transportation, while the non-tradable sectors are
Education and Health, Financial Activities, Other Services, Professional Services, Ser-
vice Providing. We employ the specification in column 4 of Table 5, therefore the main
weather-covariates are the number of shocks during a quarter. Table 8 displays the result
for tradable goods (column 1) and non-tradable ones (column 2). Interestingly, negative
e↵ects of minimum temperature and rainfall shocks are all concentrated on industries with
tradable goods and they are consistent with the analysis in Table 4 and Table 5. The value
of shocks on maximum temperature is positive but only for sector with non-tradable goods.
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This estimate identifies a net-role of the nature of the goods in determining an e↵ect of
climate on income, thus establishing that the more an industry is engaged in trade the
higher will be its exposition to weather shocks.
6.3 Financial development
This section investigates the role of financial development and savings in determining
the e↵ect of weather shocks. Intuitively, in counties where there is a higher concentration
of banks activities one would expect that extreme events would a↵ect less private wages.
The reason behind this intuition is that banks could allow firms and individuals to borrow
for paying wages in private sector during catastrophic events. This induces a mitigation
of the e↵ect of extreme events, as suggested by Jayachandran (2006) in case of developing
countries. Data on total number of banks and saving institutions have been extracted at
county level from the Censtat database of US. They are supplied on an annual basis for
the period 1990-2006. We divide total number of banks and saving institutions by the
average yearly population in each county to obtain a county-year panel with the average
number of banks per capita. Then, we merge the resulting panel with the original dataset
of weather shocks, which are averaged also at year level.
Table 9 shows results obtained adding to the usual specification the new variable on bank
density and its interaction with the average number of weather shocks in the year. In
Table 9 shocks on maximum temperature have a negative e↵ect on wage-growth which is
more than compensated by the interaction of the extreme event with the bank density,
indicating that the larger is the number of banks per capita in a county, the higher will be
the positive e↵ect of maximum temperature shocks on wage growth. Surprisingly, financial
development does not appear to mitigate the e↵ects of minimum temperature or rainfall
shocks on wage growth. However, only rainfall shocks have a significant e↵ect on wage
and this is probably due to the redefinition of the panel on annual basis, which is likely to
reduce the variation of the main covariates determining non-significant results similar to
the standard ones in the climate-economic literature.
7. Robustness
In Table 10 we conduct the same analyses of Table 4 and Table 5 but we reduce the
sample in a balanced panel one, following Nickell (1981) who suggests that the number
of observations needs to be large to avoid biases in the estimates of the standard errors.
Table 10 shows the results for two balanced sub-samples, for the period 1990-2000 and
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1990-2002, where observations per id are respectively 44 and 52. The first two columns
report the extensive margin (corresponding to column 4 of Table 4), while the last two
display the intensive margin (where I fit specification 4 of Table 5). For what concerns
the extensive margin, the positive e↵ect of maximum temperature is confirmed and the
coe cient associated to shocked quarters is slightly higher than the one in Table 4. Rain-
fall shocked quarters show more variability in the coe cient, while the extensive margin
analysis for the period 1990-2000 confirms the results of the main section. When turning
to the sample 1990q1-2002q4 statistical significance decreases but the coe cient remains
negative. In addition, minimum temperature is not significant as in the main results,
giving consistency to the analysis. Moving to the intensive margin, both sub-panels are
coherent with the estimation in Table 5. An increase of one shock in the total maximum
temperature causes an increase of 0.3% in average daily wage both for the panel 1990-2000
and for the panel 1990-2002. Furthermore, an increase of one shock in the total rainfall
ones during the quarter induces a decrease on average daily private wages of 0.1-0.2%,
again consistent with Table 5.
A second test consists in varying the level of the confidence interval for the shock’s defi-
nition. For this purpose, in Table 11 shocks are defined di↵erently from the main part of
the analysis. In column 1-2 we reduce the level of the confidence band and observations
are identified as shocks if their value is outside the 99.0% confidence interval. In column
3-4 we increase the level so that the observations need to have a value larger than 99.95%
in order to be defined as shocks. Table 11 reports the results for the intensive margin.
Both in column 1-2 and 3-4 a shock on maximum temperature has a positive and signifi-
cant e↵ect on income, confirming the estimates of the main part of the paper. Minimum
temperature shocks have a small, negative and non-significant e↵ect as evident in column
1-2 and gains statistical significance in column 3-4, where the shocks are extremely high
(value>99.95%). The opposite happens with rainfall shocks. As Table 11 shows the e↵ect
of rainfall on private wage remains the same but the statistical power decreases when we
define as shocks only observations outside the 99.5%. While this result could arise some
doubt on the right level of the shock definition, it should be noticed that income is a↵ected
by extreme weather events heterogeneously, as showed in the main part of the study, and
the extreme events themselves need to be identified at local level. Indeed, the sign of the
coe cients in Table 11 is the same of the main analysis and the loss of statistical power is
probably due to the exclusion from the treated group of observations that are e↵ectively
influencing the private wage. Thus, following this interpretation, the test instead of hin-
dering the overall result of the paper supports the idea that each weather variable has a
di↵erent e↵ect on income even in a developed country and that this needs to be taken into
account when investigating the interaction between weather and income.
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8. Conclusion
This paper studies the e↵ect of extreme weather events on average daily private wages
in US counties, contributing to the recent climate-economics literature. This is a new result
for a developed country. We demonstrate that the occurrence of short but intense extreme
events during a quarter has a significant and heterogeneous e↵ect on wages. Shocks on
maximum temperature have a positive e↵ect on the salary level. The occurrence of a
single shock increases average daily private wage by 0.1% in a quarter, corresponding to
an increase of 6.41% of daily productivity. Conversely, both cold and rainfall events a↵ect
negatively private wage and their elasticities are respectively equal to -0.04% and -0.1%.
In the second part of the paper we focus on sectoral wage and we show that large part
of the economy is influenced by extreme events. Both wage in climate-sensitive sectors11
such as Construction, or non-climate-sensitive industries, as for instance Manufacturing,
are altered by the happening of extreme events. Finally, we exploits di↵erences across
sectors to shed light on this peculiar pattern.We explore three di↵erent dimensions: the
agricultural dependence of the county, the tradability of the goods in the sector and
the level of financial development of the counties. Agriculture has a role only in the
propagation of cold events and this probably indicates that the level of resilience to the
other types of shocks is high for a developed country such as US. Tradability, which
di↵ers from the climate-sensitive definition of Gra↵ Zivin and Neidell (2014) mainly by the
inclusion of Good-Producing and Manufacturing in the tradable cluster, is one of the main
channels of propagation of weather shocks. The cluster of tradable-goods sectors is the
only a↵ected negatively by cold and rainfall events. Warm events fuels sensibly the growth
of private income in the non-tradable sectors. Thus, while previously the exposition itself
to climate during the productive cycle was considered as the main factor easing weather
influence on income, this result points out that all the income-realization process, from
the production to the moment in which demand matches supply, is strongly a↵ected by
weather. Finally, financial development fuels wage’s growth in case of positive temperature
shocks but does not helps in smoothing consumption during cold or rainfall events. Still
many mechanisms hidden behind the role of weather on daily life remain unexplored.
This is mainly caused by the absence of complete weather series and individual daily
observations and decisions. This study provides empirical evidence on the heterogeneity
that characterizes a complex phenomenon such as climate change, which needs to be
addressed with more resources and specific policies depending on the sector considered.
11as defined by Gra↵ Zivin and Neidell (2014)
21
References
- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. ”Reversal of fortune:
Geography and institutions in the making of the modern world income distribution.”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117.4 (2002): 1231-1294.
- Au↵hammer, Maximilian, Hsiang, S. M., Schlenker, W., Sobel, A. ”Using weather
data and climate model output in economic analyses of climate change.” Review of
Environmental Economics and Policy (2013): ret016.
- Barreca, Alan, Clay, K., Deschenes, O., Greenstone, M., Shapiro, J. S. Adapting to
climate change: the remarkable decline in the US temperature-mortality relationship
over the 20th century. No. w18692. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2013.
- Dell, Melissa, Benjamin F. Jones, and Benjamin A. Olken. ”Temperature and In-
come: Reconciling New Cross-Sectional and Panel Estimates.” The American Eco-
nomic Review 99.2 (2009): 198-204.
- Dell, Melissa, Benjamin F. Jones, and Benjamin A. Olken. ”Temperature shocks
and economic growth: Evidence from the last half century.” American Economic
Journal: Macroeconomics 4.3 (2012): 66-95.
- Dell, Melissa, Benjamin F. Jones, and Benjamin A. Olken. ”What Do We Learn
from the Weather? The New Climate-Economy Literature.” Journal of Economic
Literature 52.3 (2014): 740-98.
- De Giorgi, Giacomo and L. Pistaferri 2013. Climate Volatility Change and Precau-
tionary Behavior. Columbia University working paper.
- Deschenes, Olivier, and Michael Greenstone. ”The economic impacts of climate
change: evidence from agricultural output and random fluctuations in weather.”
The American Economic Review (2007): 354-385.
- Epstein, Y., et al. ”Psychomotor deterioration during exposure to heat.” Aviation,
space, and environmental medicine 51.6 (1980): 607-610.
- Fisher, Anthony C., et al. ”The economic impacts of climate change: evidence from
agricultural output and random fluctuations in weather: comment.” The American
Economic Review 102.7 (2012): 3749-3760.
- Gallup, John Luke, Je↵rey D. Sachs, and Andrew D. Mellinger. ”Geography and
economic development.” International regional science review 22.2 (1999): 179-232.
22
- Gra↵ Zivin, J and M Neidell, Temperature and the Allocation of Time: Implications
for Climate Change, Journal of Labor Economics, 32(2014): 1-26.
- Hancock, Peter A., Jennifer M. Ross, and James L. Szalma. ”A meta-analysis of
performance response under thermal stressors.” Human Factors: The Journal of the
Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 49.5 (2007): 851-877.
- Hsiang, Solomon M. ”Temperatures and cyclones strongly associated with economic
production in the Caribbean and Central America.” Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences 107.35 (2010): 15367-15372.
- IPCC (2013), Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis Summary for Poli-
cymakers.
- Jayachandran, Seema. ”Selling labor low: Wage responses to productivity shocks in
developing countries.” Journal of political Economy 114.3 (2006): 538-575.
- Jones, Benjamin F., and Benjamin A. Olken. ”Climate Shocks and Exports.” Amer-
ican Economic Review 100.2 (2010): 454-59.
- Nickell, Stephen. ”Biases in dynamic models with fixed e↵ects.” Econometrica:
Journal of the Econometric Society (1981): 1417-1426.
- Niemel, Raimo, et al. ”The e↵ect of air temperature on labour productivity in call
centresa case study.” Energy and Buildings 34.8 (2002): 759-764.
- Pilcher, June J., Eric Nadler, and Caroline Busch. ”E↵ects of hot and cold temper-
ature exposure on performance: a meta-analytic review.” Ergonomics 45.10 (2002):
682-698.
- Ramankutty, Navin, and Jonathan A. Foley. ”Estimating historical changes in global
land cover: Croplands from 1700 to 1992.” Global biogeochemical cycles 13.4 (1999):
997-1027.
- Ramsey, Jerry D. ”Task performance in heat: a review.” Ergonomics 38.1 (1995):
154-165.
- Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi. ”Institutions rule: the
primacy of institutions over geography and integration in economic development.”
Journal of economic growth 9.2 (2004): 131-165.
- Sachs, Je↵rey D., and Andrew M. Warner. ”Sources of slow growth in African
economies.” Journal of African economies 6.3 (1997): 335-376.
23
- Schlenker, Wolfram, and David B. Lobell. ”Robust negative impacts of climate
change on African agriculture.” Environmental Research Letters 5.1 (2010): 014010.
- Strobl, Eric. ”The economic growth impact of hurricanes: evidence from US coastal
counties.” Review of Economics and Statistics 93.2 (2011): 575-589.
24
9. Appendix and tables
Dummies identifying quarter with positive temperature shocks ( tmaxc,q), negative
temperature shocks ( tminc,q), and rainfall shocks ( precc,q) are defined as follows:
 tmaxc,q =
8<:1 if tmaxd,c,q > ¯tmaxc,q¯ + 3.09 tmaxc,q¯ & tmaxd 1,c,q > ¯tmaxc,q¯ + 3.09 tmaxc,q¯0 otherwhise
 tminc,q =
8<:1 if tmind,c,q < ¯tminc,q¯   3.09 tminc,q¯ & tmind 1,c,q < ¯tminc,q¯   3.09 tminc,q¯0 otherwhise
 precc,q =
8<:1 if precd,c,q > ¯precc,q¯ + 3.09 precc,q¯ & precd 1,c,q > ¯precc,q¯ + 3.09 precc,q¯0 otherwhise
Table 1: Historical (1980-1989) and sample (1990-2006) weather statistics
Mean SD
Historical tmax (C ) 18.48 4.78
Sample tmax (C ) 18.66 9.46
Historical tmin(C ) 5.92 4.57
Sample tmin (C ) 6.34 8.81
Historical precipitation (mm) 2.55 0.97
Sample precipitation (mm) 2.67 1.65
Total observations (N) 720,196
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Table 2: weather shock statistics
Mean SD Min Max
dummy tmax shock 0.03 0.17 0 1
dummy tmin shock 0.28 0.45 0 1
dummy rainfall shock 0.16 0.365 0 1
Total tmax shocks per quarter 0.86 0.658 0 30
Total tmin shocks per quarter 1.07 2.61 0 42
Total rainfall shocks per quarter 0.20 0.537 0 29
Total observations (N) 720,196
Table 3: Daily real wage statistics by sector (USD deflated using CPI in 2006) and other
data
N Mean S. D.
Construction 56,476 44.10 13.02
Education and Health Services 61,134 37.13 11.80
Financial Activities 61,464 44.32 17.04
Goods-Producing 64,336 48.51 14.85
Information 47,788 48.88 18.76
Leisure and Hospitality 63,432 15.56 5.36
Manufacturing 56,407 50.57 15.69
Natural Resources and Mining 55,428 42.66 19.67
Other Services 55,642 26.86 7.73
Professional and Business Services 57,549 41.41 16.18
Service-Providing 64,558 34.30 11.31
Trade, Transportation, and Utilities 65,071 35.58 8.97
Data for heterogeneity and other data
Mean fraction of area harvested 673,349 0.35 0.26
Bank per capita *100 180,415 0.042 0.025
Ln population 720,196 10.60 1.45
Dummy Hurricane 720,196 .03 0.17
26
Table 4: Extensive margin analysis, FE model on the e↵ect of weather shocks (dummies)
on natural log of average daily wage
Dependent variable: natural log of daily labor income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dummy tmax shock 0.003 0.004** 0.004** 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
dummy tmin shock 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
dummy rainfall shock -0.002*** -0.001* -0.001* -0.001*
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
log of initial income (lag 1) 0.456*** 0.453 *** 0.45 ***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Log of population (lag 1) N N Y Y
Dummy Hurricane N N N Y
Counties FE Y Y Y Y
Sector FE Y Y Y Y
Quarterly FE Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.02 0.89 0.76 0.66
Observations 709,285 649,416 649,416 649,416
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Note: The table reports estimates obtained fitting an OLS Fixed-e↵ect model. The dependent variable
is the natural log of daily labor income. All the specifications (columns 1 to 4) include county, sector,
and quarterly FE. Standard errors are clustered at State by Sector level.
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Table 5: Intensive margin: FE model on the e↵ect of an increase in the numbers of
weather shocks on natural log of average daily wage
Dependent variable: natural log of daily labor wage in a quarter
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total tmax shocks 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Total tmin shocks -0.000 -0.0003* -0.0004* -0.0004*
(0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Total rainfall shocks - 0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
log of initial wage (lag 1) 0.456*** 0.453*** 0.453***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Log of population (lag 1) N N Y Y
Dummy Hurricane N N N Y
Counties FE Y Y Y Y
Sector FE Y Y Y Y
Quarterly FE Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.02 0.90 0.88 0.76
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Note: The table reports estimates obtained fitting an OLS Fixed-e↵ect model. The dependent variable
is the natural log of daily labor income. All the specifications (columns 1 to 4) include county, sector,









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8: Intensive margin of the e↵ect of weather shocks on natural log of sectoral daily
wage by type of tradable and non-tradable sectors, using specification 4 of Table 5
Tradable Non-tradable
Total tmax shocks 0.001 0.001***
(0.001) (0.001)
Total tmin shocks -0.001*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Total rainfall shocks -0.001** -0.001
(0.000) (0.001)
Log of population (lag 1) Y Y
Dummy Hurricane Y Y
Counties FE Y Y
Sector FE Y Y
Quarterly FE Y Y
R-squared 0.77 0.73
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Note: The table reports estimates obtained fitting an OLS Fixed-e↵ect model with all the controls of
specification 4 in Table 5. The dependent variable is the natural log of daily labor income. Standard
errors are clustered at State by Sector level.
Table 9: Intensive margin of the e↵ect of weather shocks on natural log of sectoral daily
wage considering bank density for the period 1990-2006, using specification 4 of Table 5
(1) (2)
Total tmax shocks -0.01** -0.01**
(0.000) (0.000)
Total tmin shocks -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Total rainfall shocks -0.004* -0.004*
(0.001) (0.000)
bank density -0.01 -0.01
(0.05) (0.000)
bank density x Total tmax shock 0.12* 0.12*
(0.06) (0.06)
bank density x Total tmin shock 0.003 -0.003
(0.009) (0.009)
bank density x Total rainfall shock 0.003 -0.001
(0.04) (0.04)
Controls N Y
Counties FE Y Y
Sector FE Y Y
Year FE Y Y
R-squared 0.96 0.91
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Note: The table reports estimates obtained fitting an OLS Fixed-e↵ect model with all the controls of
specification 4 in Table 5. The dependent variable is the natural log of daily labor income. Standard
errors are clustered at State by Sector level.
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Table 10: Robustness on intensive and extensive margin with balanced panel, e↵ects of
weather shocks on private wage
EM EM IM IM
dummy tmax shock 0.006** 0.006**
(0.003) (0.003)
dummy tmin shock 0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
dummy rainfall shock -0.002*** -0.001
(0.000) (0.0001)
Total tmax shocks 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
Total tmin shocks 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Total rainfall shocks -0.002*** -0.001*
(0.000) (0.001)
Coverage of the balanced panel 1990-2000 1990-2002 1990-2000 1990-2002
Log of initial income (lag 1) Y Y Y Y
Log of population (lag 1) Y Y Y Y
Dummy Hurricane Y Y Y Y
Counties FE Y Y Y Y
Sector FE Y Y Y Y
Quarterly FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 104,368 99627 104,368 99627
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Note: The table reports estimates obtained fitting an OLS Fixed-e↵ect model. The dependent variable
is the natural log of daily labor income. All the specifications (columns 1 to 4) include county, sector,
and quarterly FE, lagged population and lagged wage. Standard errors are clustered at State by Sector
level.
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Table 11: Robustness test on the intensive margin defining as shock observations outside
99% confidence band (column 1-2) and observations outside 99.95% (column 3-4).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total tmax shocks 0.000** 0.000** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.0000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Total tmin shocks - 0.000 -0.000 -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Total rainfall shocks -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.0000) (0.000) (0.0005)
Definition of the shock obs>99.0% obs>99.0% obs>99.95% obs>99.95%
Log of initial income (lag 1) Y Y Y Y
Log of population (lag 1) Y Y Y Y
Dummy Hurricane N Y N Y
Counties FE Y Y Y Y
Sector FE Y Y Y Y
Quarterly FE Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76
State-sector clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Note: The table reports estimates obtained fitting an OLS Fixed-e↵ect model. The dependent variable
is the natural log of daily labor income. All the specifications (columns 1 to 4) include county, sector,
and quarterly FE, lagged population and lagged wage. Standard errors are clustered at State by Sector
level.
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Figure 1: Spatial distribution of NCDC’s meteorological station in analysis
Figure 2: Spatial distribution of average daily wage 1990-2006 (2006 USD)
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Figure 3: Example of shock identification for tmax, red dots are two couples of observations
that are defined as shocks in the empirical strategy
Figure 4: Negative correlation between daily temperature excursion and ln of average
income by county
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Figure 5: The e↵ect of total tmax shocks on wage rolling on fraction of area harvested
Note: the figure reports the result from the rolling-windows regressions using the main specification
with FE on States instead of counties, where the window is of 60,000 observations and proceed with
step equal to 2,500 observations. Rolling is on the average fraction of area harvested by county. The
blue line shows the coe cient estimates for the total number of shocks on maximum temperature and
the red lines the 5-percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 6: The e↵ect of total tmin shocks on wage rolling on fraction of area harvested
Note: the figure reports the result from the rolling-windows regressions using the main specification
with FE on States instead of counties, where the window is of 60,000 observations and proceed with
step equal to 2,500 observations. Rolling is on the average fraction of area harvested by county. The
blue line shows the coe cient estimates for the total number of shocks on minimum temperature and
the red lines the 5-percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 7: The e↵ect of total prec shocks on wage rolling on fraction of area harvested
Note: the figure reports the result from the rolling-windows regressions using the main specification
with FE on States instead of counties, where the window is of 60,000 observations and proceed with
step equal to 2,500 observations. Rolling is on the average fraction of area harvested by county. The
blue line shows the coe cient estimates for the total number of shocks on precipitation and the red
lines the 5-percent confidence intervals.
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What are the socioeconomic e ects of foreign aid in developing countries? How e ective is aid in
promoting social capital? The paper focuses on these questions from an empirical perspective and
assesses the casual e ect of foreign aid on trust in Uganda. Individuals living in counties that received
more aid exhibit up to 13.3% higher probability to trust others with respect to those living in counties
with no aid. The same finding holds when taking into account the intensive margin, i.e. an increase of
1% in foreign aid induces an increase of 1.1% in the probability of trusting other people. We use also
an instrumental strategy based on the enforcement of Non Governmental Organizations (Amendment)
Act and we show that the link from aid to trust is robust to di erent estimation strategies. Finally, we
find that a channel is operating through lowering inequality. We demonstrate that foreign aid has a
stronger e ect in counties where there is a lower level of perceived inequality.
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1 Introduction
The e ectiveness of foreign aid is an old debated issue among economists and development experts.
In this paper, we depart from the traditional focus on the pure economic outcome of aid and look at the
potential e ect on trust. A recent strand of the growth literature has stressed the importance of the role
of cultural values in economic development. In particular, trust, broadly defined as cooperative attitude
outside the family circle and usually taken as a proxy for social capital, is considered a key element of
many economic and social outcomes by social scientists and increasingly also by economists.1
Combining individual-level survey data on trust with georeferenced county-level data on aid, we
ask whether aid flows a ected how generalized trust changed over time. We hypothesize that large
disbursements of aid funds in a county contribute to increase the generalized trust (i.e. trust on other
people) of individuals living in that county or, equivalently, to reduce the trust deficit over time. Since a
trust deficit may hinder the e ectiveness of aid in furthering development outcomes, a direct e ect of aid
in recovering trust represents an important feature to consider while planning how to foster long lasting
development.
We contribute to the empirical literature on foreign aid by adding novel evidence about the
socioeconomic e ects of aid from a microeconomic perspective. Given the important policy implications,
it is therefore surprising that there is little direct evidence on the relationship between foreign aid and
population attitudes - in particular, trust - in the extant literature. By contrast, there is a large debated
literature on how e ective is foreign aid in reducing poverty, enhancing governance or other economic
outcomes.
The paper focuses on Uganda due to its status of developing country and because it has an experience
of disruption of capital due to violent conflicts occurred during the last decade. Although Uganda has been
studied for social capital, allowing useful comparisons in the field, the importance of the building-e ect
of external funding is still unexplored. For example, Rohner et al. [29] study the influence of civil
conflict on social capital, focusing on Uganda’s experience during the last decade and highlight how such
a large disruptive contemporaneous shock changes beliefs and social capital by reducing generalized trust.
Conversely, in this study we hypothesize that the disbursement of funds through the financing of foreign
aid initiatives by donors, represents a positive contemporaneous shock that changes beliefs and social
1See Algan and Cahuc [5] for an extensive review of the recent research on trust, institutions and growth.
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capital, and increases trust.
To test our hypothesis, we use data from the 2012 Afrobarometer survey and from AidData and
examine whether individuals living in counties that received more aid in the last decade are more trusting
of others today. We find that individuals living in counties that received more aid exhibit higher levels of
generalized trust today. This finding holds both for the extensive margin (whether the county received or
not aid) and the intensive margin (how many funds the county received). Particularly, the more funds the
county received, the higher is the level of trust of individuals living in that county.
An alternative explanation for our finding is that more aid has been directed to counties that initially
were more trusting, and that these higher levels of trust simply remain unchanged today. Alternatively,
there might be other factors, such as individual and county specific characteristics, that are correlated
with the amount of aid flows and subsequent levels of trust. In our methodological approach, we consider
a number of ways to determine whether the correlations we uncover are indeed causal.
Our first strategy is to study the shift in individual trust with respect to the previous survey, by
controlling for the county-average level of trust in the previous period. Moreover, we use predetermined
independent variables, i.e. we do not use contemporaneous values of aid and trust. A second check is to
control for a number of county and district level characteristics - such as, among others, urbanization,
number of micro-enterprises, unemployment rate. The intuition is that by controlling for this extensive
set of covariates, we capture any potential e ects other than aid on trust.
Our alternative approach is the use of instrumental variables. This requires an instrument that
is correlated with the presence of aid in the county but uncorrelated with any characteristics that may
a ect the level of trust of the individuals in that county. We use the distance of each county from
the committee belonging to the same district of the county itself. The introduction of the particularly
restrictive legislation that disciplines the ordinary activity of NGOs in Uganda (the NGO Registration
Act) provides a basis for the instrument’s exogeneity. The IV regressions produce estimates that are
qualitatively consistent with the OLS estimates.
In section 2, we begin our study by first describing the historical and conceptual background. We
discuss the traditional literature on foreign aid and its e ectiveness, we summarize the recent economic
performance of Uganda and we give a broader macroeconomic perspective on the relationship between aid
and trust. In section 3, we turn to a presentation of the data sources, before describing the methodology
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and the empirics in section 4. In section 5 we study the relationship between aid, inequality and trust.
section 6 describes robustness checks while section 7 concludes.
2 Literature and background
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) defines foreign aid as financial flows, technical assistance, and commodities that
are designed to promote economic development and welfare as their main objective, i.e. aid for military or
other non-development purposes is excluded, and are provided as either grants or subsidized loans.2 Based
on this definition, aid represents one of the largest components of foreign capital flows to low-income
countries, while for most middle-income countries private capital flows are more important. On average,
between 2000 and 2012, Uganda, classified by the World Bank as a low income country, received foreign
aid worth 13 percent of its GNI, that sum up to almost 75% of central government expense.3
One of the most debated issues in development economics is whether foreign aid promotes economic
growth in aid recipient countries. The topic is relevant to both donors, given the di culty of keeping up
with the same level of aid as in the past in the current global economic crisis, and recipients countries,
given their di culty, among others, to meet the goal set by the United Nations of reducing poverty to
half the 1990 level by 2015.4
The academic research on aid has traditionally focused on the e ects of aid inflows on growth rates,
as well as on determining which socio-political, institutional and economic factors undermine or enhance
the e ectiveness of aid. Mosley [24] suggested that while aid seems to be e ective at the microeconomic
level, any positive aggregate impact of aid is much harder to identify, and pointed out the presence of a
"micro-macro paradox".
Bourguignon and Sundberg [8] refer to a ’black box’ to describe the relationship between aid and
development, given that the empirical literature on aid e ectiveness has yielded unclear and ambiguous
results, due to the heterogeneity of aid motives, the limitations of the tools of analysis, and the complex
2See for example Radelet [27].
3Data are taken from World Development Indicators. According to the World Bank classification, economies are divided
according to 2012 GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. The groups are: low income, $1,035 or
less; lower middle income, $1,036 - $4,085; upper middle income, $4,086 - $12,615; and high income,$12,616 or more. In
Uganda GNI per capita in 2012 is $480.
4This is one of the eight Millennium Development Goals.
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causality chain linking external aid to final outcomes. Rajan and Subramanian [28] conclude how di cult
it is to find any systematic e ect of aid on growth, at a macroeconomic level.
The impact of aid on growth is an empirical question and has been extensively studied in the macro
literature in the last four decades.5 The quantitative cross-country analyses of the macroeconomic impact
of foreign aid on growth has seen three di erent stages. The first wave of the literature on aid and growth
can be traced back to the so called "gap-models" where the emphasis was on the e ects of financing
constraints on growth in low income countries and how aid could alleviate them ( Chenery and Strout
[12]; Domar [15]; Bacha [6]). A second wave of the literature focused on a direct investigation of the
aid-growth relationship, instead of addressing the topic only indirectly through the aid-savings link and
produced contradictory results ( Levy [22]). A third generation of panel based econometric studies started
in the ’90s with the aim of assessing whether the impact of aid on growth was unconditionally positive
and what are the necessary conditions to make aid e ective in recipient countries ( Burnside and Dollar
[9]; Alesina and Dollar [3]; Collier and Dollar [13]; Dalgaard et al. [14]). More recently, Chatterjee
et al. [11] study the e ectiveness of aid on the growth performance of recipient countries by looking at
indirect mechanisms through which aid a ects growth. In particular, by looking at linkages between the
composition of foreign aid and the composition of government-spending, they find that the fungibility
of aid matters and that the composition of aid is important in determining and a ecting the economic
outcomes.
From a microeconomic perspective, besides the impact evaluation of specific projects, there is lack
of any systematic academic evidence on the impact of aid on growth.6 The main di culty in producing
microeconomic evidence on the topic is data availability. If AidData provides localized data about the aid
projects at the county level, at the same time there are no localized data to measure local development,
i.e. there are not reliable statistics about each county’s GDP. If, on one hand, it is not possible to measure
economic development at the county level, on the other hand, there are survey data on trust at the
individual level that can be used as county-level proxy of development. Data on trust in the economic
literature are usually used as proxy for social capital.7 Social capital refers to the institutions, relationships,
5See Hansen and Tarp [20] for a comprehensive review of the aid literature.
6The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) evaluates the activities of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) and International Development Association (inside the World Bank), the work of International Finance
Corporation (IFC) in private sector development, and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency’s (MIGA) guarantee projects
and services. They generally report positive assessment when looking at individual specific initiatives.
7See, among others, Butler et al. [10], Giuliano and Spilimbergo [19].
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and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society’s social interactions. Academics interested on
African development issues used survey data on trust in many instances. Relying on Afrobarometer and
historical data, Nunn and Wantchekon [26] find that individuals in sub-Saharan African countries whose
ancestors’ ethnicities were subject to a high intensity of enslavement report lower trust levels today.
Milner et al. [23] document additional evidence on aid and beliefs in Uganda and highlight how aid
e ectiveness should be not studied per se but compared to other domestic programs and by looking at
recipients’ beliefs about foreign aid. In particular, they provide evidence that in Uganda citizens view aid
as less prone to political manipulation and does more e cient than government activities.
The Global Humanitarian Assistance (2014) ranks the country as the 16th largest ODA recipient
country in the world in 2011. Total aid received were 1.5 billions of dollars, including 80 millions of
humanitarian assistance. The high need for external funding in Uganda is also emphasized by the fact
that the country is classified as ’fragile state’, and it shows the highest level of vulnerability index
score.According to Global Humanitarian Assistance (2014), such rankings largely depend on the fact that
the country experienced a number of conflicts during the last decade. Regarding the contribution of aid in
improving the country’s situation, the US Department of State (2013) documents how: “the assistance
enhances social and economic well-being throughout the country, and U.S. support improves the lives of
hundreds of thousands of Ugandans.”
In general, countries assistance programs aim at promoting good governance and human rights,
the strengthening of democracy, the conduct of free and fair elections. They also aim at addressing
health threats, as well as improving maternal and child health and coping with Ugandan fast population
growth through family planning, agricultural productivity, food security, and nutrition, besides several
other environmental issues, such as global warming and climate change. The way the programs are
implemented and their final goals may have di erent impacts on population, both from a physical and
from a social perspective. For example, in 2012 US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
provided antiretroviral therapy (ART) to more than 228,000 people and care for 400,000 HIV-infected
patients, we can trivially hypothesize that these individuals not only experienced a direct benefit from
the occurrence of the event - receiving foreign aid - in terms of increased life expectancy, but they also
changed their believes on external agents, increased their generalized trust on other people, and these
all together led to better average living conditions in the country. Thus, following our premises, the
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underlying mechanism that we have in mind should work through the direct interaction of inhabitants
with other people. Hence, in our study we select funds delivered from 25 agencies that addresses ten
primary sectors (listed in Appendix 2), for a total of 1315 projects 8.
3 Data Sources and Description
Data for this study come from two di erent databases: AidData 3.0 and Afrobarometer.9
AidData is managed by the AidData Center for Development Policy. It is a huge geospatial
dataset that contains data on more than $5.5 trillion dollars in development finance from 90 bilateral and
multilateral agencies at the project level. By specifying the precise detail of the geographic locations of
development projects, the dataset allows to analyze where aid funds are going at the sub-national level.
Therefore, it represents the most accessible and complete database to study and evaluate foreign aid. 10
Afrobarometer is a research project that measures the social, political, and economic environment in
Africa through a series of national public attitude surveys on democracy and governance. Afrobarometer
surveys are conducted in 35 African countries and are repeated on a regular cycle. Each survey contains a
standard set of questions, thus making possible comparisons across countries and over time.
In our analysis we employ the most recently issued Afrobarometer survey for Uganda, i.e. Round 5
that covers year 2012 ( AfrobarometerData [2]). Among other questions, respondent answer the following
question:
• Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful
in dealing with people?
a] Most people can be trusted
b] Must be very careful
The answer given to this question represents our main dependent variable, that takes value 1 if the
individual answer "Most people can be trusted", 0 otherwise. Thus, we build a cross-sectional dataset at
the individual level, where for each individual we have a set of information on individual characteristics,
including the county of residence.
8We do not report the list of projects due to limited space, but it is available upon request.
9See Tierney et al. [30] and AfrobarometerData [1]
10 Findley et al. [16] and Fleck and Kilby [17], among others, have used AidData to study implications of aid and conflicts.
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Our main explanatory variable is a dummy on the presence of funds in a specific county. We
employ data from the Uganda Aid Management Platform, a new dataset release that includes all foreign
aid disbursed in Uganda since 1996. For each project, the dataset includes information about donors,
quantity disbursed, project category, project objective, signature and starting date, completion date, and
the chronology of the disbursement. We consider 1315 projects, sponsored by 25 di erent agencies and
involving more than 10 di erent sectors of activity (for an extensive list of sectors financed by each agency
please refer to Appendix 2). We build a dummy variable taking value 1, if at least one project delivered
aid in that county for the period 2008-2010, 0 otherwise. We limit the time sample to 2008-2010 because
Afrobarometer survey has been delivered in 2012 but it refers to a fieldwork that started in 2011 so we
cannot consider funds that arrived in 2011.
The timing of the analysis is displayed in Figure 1, where we plot the time series of foreign aid in
Uganda and the waves of Afrobarometer that we employ in the analysis. Foreign aid have a huge increase
during 2006-2011, mainly associated with the end of the conflicts in the north of the country and the
presence of Uganda in the security council of UN during 2009-201011. Wave 4 of Afrobarometer was
delivered in 2008, and we use it here mainly to correct our estimates by taking into account the previous
level of county’s average trust. Afrobarometer’s wave 5 is our dataset of interest for the individual analysis.
Fig. 1. Level of foreign aid (USD) and waves from Afrobarometer
Figure 2 shows the localization of aid in Uganda according to AidData. While the distribution of
funds seems homogeneous all over the country, there is evidence of high concentration of projects at the
boarder with Kenya and Rwanda (east and south-west). Furthermore, some counties in the middle of the
11For an in depth discussion of the correlation of foreign aid with presence in UN’s security council, see Kuziemko and
Werker [21]
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country do not receive foreign aid at all, and we use them as a control sample in the rest of the study.
Fig. 2. Geolocalized foreign aid in Uganda.
Table 1 lists summary statistics for individuals in our sample, clustered depending on whether their
county of residence received foreign aid between 2008 and 2010. Column 2 to 7 of Table 1 report number
of observations, mean and standard deviation for all the variables divided into the two groups.
According to those statistics, large part of the sample received external aid over the period considered,
while around 20 percent of the sample did not receive any funding. Furthermore, that fraction remains
constant when dropping those observations that are perfectly predicted by adding counties, ethnic or
agency fixed e ects. For what concerns individual level variables, people in counties that received aid
are on average more rural, the average of the dummy is 0.82 against 0.92 of the control group, they are
younger and report di erent access to services (more access to piped water system but less access to
cell phone services); they show more variance in the educational level (more individual with high and
low education). Considering county and district-level variables, there are strong di erences between the
two groups. Almost all the variables considered, with the exception of the average trust in relatives in
2008, are significantly di erent between the two clusters. Trust in 2008 is higher in counties that did not
receive fund (as trust in other people and in known people). Furthermore, counties that did not receive
aid are characterized by a smaller unemployment rate, lower level of subsistence by farms, lower number
of micro-enterprises and higher ethnic fragmentation. All those dimensions are negatively correlated
with trust suggesting that if it were the case that our result would be determined only by cross sectional
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di erences in counties’ characteristics, the regression sign should be the opposite of what we find.
A commonly used proxy for per capita income, satellite nightlights are lower in the control group,
however this is extremely correlated to the lower degree of urbanization in the same group and somehow
compensated by the higher level of urban population. Finally, as ethnic-level variable we consider the
traditional ethnic-group specific dependence on some activity (such as hunting, fishing, agriculture or
animal husbandry) that we take from the Ethnographic Atlas of Murdoch [25].
[Insert Table 1 and Table 2 here]
4 Empirics
We begin by estimating the relationship between the presence of a fund in a county over the period
2008-2010 and the level of trust in that county as surveyed in 2012. Following Rohner et al. [29], our
baseline estimating equation is a standard probit-model as follows:
Pr(trust2012i,c = 1) = [—0 + —1dummy_fundsc + —2trust2008c + –Xi + ⁄r+ (1)
agencyj + projectk + ethnicm + µi,c]
where trust2012i,c is a dummy which varies across individuals and takes value 1 if in county c the person
i answers in the survey that most people can be trusted, 0 otherwise; trust2008c denotes the county-average
level of trust from the previous wave of the survey; dummy_fundsc is a binary variable assuming value 1
if funding occurred in 2008-2010 in that county. ⁄r are region fixed-e ects, which are included to capture
region-specific factors that may a ect trust; agency and projects are donors and project destinations
fixed-e ects; ethnic are fixed e ect on ethnicity and µi,c are county-clustered individual errors. The use
of region and ethnic fixed e ects, as well as county-clustered errors is a standard methodology to allow
for common e ects and spatial correlation among individuals belonging to the same county, while the
use of agency and project fixed e ects is peculiar and crucial to the purpose of the analysis. Given the
heterogeneity that characterizes projects and agencies implementing them, such fixed e ects capture the
singularity of each agency and of each type of project, helping us in identifying the net e ect of funding,
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independently of who is actually implementing it and how it is developed.
Xi denotes a matrix of individual-level covariates, which include the respondent’s demographic
characteristics, such as age, age squared, employment status, and educational level. 12 Other individual
level covariates considered ares possession of radio, television, and vehicles, an indicator variable that
equals one if the respondent lives in an urban location instead or a rural ones. The matrix also includes
a set of variables designed to capture the composition and characteristics of the county in which the
respondent lives, which include population size, di usion of mobile phone services, availability of schools,
access to electricity, piped water and sewage system, age-dependency ratio, share of manufacture, share of
subsistence farming, net migration, number of micro-enterprises, adjusted total fertility rate, unemployment
rate, ethnic fractionalization and nightlight.
When considering our cross-sectional dataset, we need to deal with the issue of potential reverse
causality. Foreign aid could be allocated according to several dimensions, such as a higher or lower level
of trust or corruption, or according to allocation parameters and decisions possibly correlated with them.
Therefore, in order to partially avoid reverse causality, we focus the analysis on the shift with respect to
the previous level of trust, as in Rohner et al. [29]. In this way, we can partially overcome the problem of
reverse causality, and for this purpose we consider three di erent variables of trust - in other people, in
neighbors and in family - and compute the county-average level of generalized trust in the previous period
(trust2008c ).
4.1 Extensive margin
Table 2 reports Probit estimates of Equation 1. The estimates show that the presence of aid is
positive correlated with the subsequent level of trust. The coe cient of the dummy for the presence of
foreign aid (Dummy Fund) is positive and significant throughout all the specification considered. All the
specifications fitted include dummies for each agency, in order to capture the net e ect of aid on trust,
independently from di erences among agencies, as, for instance, e ciency in implementation.13
Table 2 reports the results from the baseline model as marginal e ects at mean value of other control
variables. We interpret results in column 1 as showing that respondents living in a county that received
12Occupation and education may be important determinant of trust themselves, as underlined in Nunn and Wantchekon
[26] and Francois et al. [18], who, in particular, provide evidence of higher levels of trust for individuals working in more
competitive sectors within the United States.
13In our dataset we have 25 di erent agencies.
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aid, have 11.4 percent higher probability of trusting other people - i.e. trust taking value 1 - than people
living in a county that did not receive aid, given that all the control variables take their mean value. Such
estimate is significant at one percent level, and robust to a set of individual, county and district level
controls, regional and agency fixed e ects.
In column 2 and 3 we increase model’s complexity, controlling for sectoral and ethnic fixed e ects.
The inclusion of sectoral fixed e ects determines an higher probability of trusting other people of 13.3
percent, meaning that people living in a county that received foreign aid show a positive e ect on trust.
The result holds also in case of ethnic fixed e ects, where the coe cient associated to presence of fund is
equal to 13.2 percent and still significant at one percent level.
Finally, in column 4 we control for religion fixed e ects and the coe cient remains significant and
equal to 11.3 percent.
[Insert Table 2 here]
In Table 3 we report the marginal e ect of the increase in one unity of other control variables in
order to compare our result on trust. In each column are reported the results obtained with the same
specification of the corresponding column in Table 2. The first variable reported is the natural log of
population, which seems to be negative correlated with trust in other people, but the coe cient associated
is significant only in column 3-4. Urban-rural dummy does not appear to be correlated with trust in other
people while the unemployement level is positively correlated with trust. This result could be driven by
the fact that in counties with higher level of unemployment individuals should rely more on the social
environment in order to find alternative resources to labor income. In addition, the result is coherent with
the dummy on the employment at individual level, that has a negative and significant coe cient equal to
-0.04. Finally, satellite nightlight is positively associated with trust, indicating that an increase of one unit
in satellite nightlight increase the probability of trusting other people of 17.5% in column 1, and up to
+26.9% in column 4. Thus, the presence of foreign aid in a county has a coe cient associated that on
average is equal to half of the one of satellite nightlight, but higher both of the unemployment and more
significant, in general, of the one linked to the natural log of population. This give us a first indication of
the magnitude that the presence of foreign aid could have on individuals believes, sometimes stronger
that the common demographic controls employed.
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[Insert Table 3 here]
4.2 Intensive margin
We now turn to a di erent dimension of aid. Table 4 reports Probit estimates for the intensive
margin of aid. The main di erence with respect to Equation 1 and Table 2 is the independent variable Ln
fund used instead of Dummy Fund. Ln fund is the level of aid received in each county. Table 4 shows the
e ects on trust of an increase of one percent in the amount of aid. Similarly to Equation 1 we regress
individual trust on the logarithm of foreign aid disbursed, and we control for the same set of characteristics
considered in Table 2. Results in Table 4 show that individual trust is highly correlated with foreign
aid. An increase of one percent in the quantity of aid is associated with an increase of 0.8 percent of
the probability of trusting other people, and the estimated coe cient is significant at one percent level
(column 1).
In column 2 and 3 we add sectoral fixed e ect and ethnic fixed e ects. The coe cient estimates are
thus robust, do not change much, and stay significant, to di erent specifications. Indeed, both in column
2 and 3, an increase of one percent of foreign aid determines an increase of 1.1 percent of trust, given that
all the other explanatory variables take their mean value.
In column 4, where we fit a model with a set of 22 religion fixed e ects, we find that the coe cient
on Ln fund is equal to 0.7 percent and significant at one percent level. Hence, our estimates are also
robust to the introduction of a bigger set of controls.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Both in Table 4 and in Table 2, when we control for the type of project and the type of agency, the
estimated coe cient increases significantly. We believe that this happens because of the heterogeneity
of projects and because of the number of agencies that implemented them. As showed by Alesina and
Dollar [3] from a macro perspective, donors give foreign aid is disbursed for di erent reasons, that may be
even completely unrelated to developing issues. There are countries that have more propensity to finance
countries that share similar international political preferences. For example, Alesina and Dollar [3] show
that there is evidence that the United States have given more aid to countries active in fighting terrorism,
and that France has financed mainly former French colonies. Such allocation patterns somehow show that
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the goal of supporting development and social capital is not considered as the primary determinant of
foreign aid. Following a similar reasoning, some type of projects or some agencies could end up delivering
aid less e ciently than we would expect. Hence, our estimates for the coe cient on aid might actually
be lower than we would hypothesize if aid were delivered only according to development considerations,
although still positive. Controlling for project and agency type allow us to get rid of the influence of the
specific characteristics of single donors or sectors, and to detect the actual correlation between aid and
trust.
4.3 Instrumental strategy: the NGO Registraction Act
The findings reported in section 4 of a positive correlation between the presence and level of aid in
a county and the subsequent level of trust are consistent with our hypothesis about the positive impact of
aid on trust. However, an alternative explanation for our findings is that more aid has been directed to
counties that initially were more trusting, and that these higher levels of trust simply remain unchanged,
or there might be other factors, such as individual and county specific characteristics, that are correlated
with the amount of aid flows and subsequent levels of trust. In this section, we address the endogeneity
concerns through the use of instrumental variables. This strategy requires an instrument that is correlated
with the presence of aid in the county but uncorrelated with any characteristics that may a ect the level
of trust of the individuals in that county.
In Uganda, a non governmental organization can operate and deliver aid funds to a county after
obtaining a specific authorization from the competent district committee. If the NGO is not authorized by
the district committee, it cannot carry out any activity and so no aid fund would arrive in Uganda. Since
2006, NGOs started to operate in counties where there were district committees. The more an agency is
located far away from the district committee, the more di cult it is to get the authorization, the lower is
the incentive for NGOs to engage in aid activities in that county, the less aid the county receives.
The legal source of the provisions on the activity of NGOs comes from a particularly restrictive
legislation that regulates the course of their ordinary activities (the NGO Registration Act). The
introduction of this law provides a basis for the instrument’s exogeneity.
The Non Governmental Organizations (Amendment) Act, passed in 2006, has undermined the
productivity of NGOs, by erecting barriers to entry, activity, funding and assembly within the sector.
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Among other factors, the precondition that all foreign funds have to be passed through the Bank of Uganda
is severely limiting the output of the NGO sector. Among others, the ICNL (International Center for
Not-for-Profit Law) has recognized how the fact that all foreign funding must be received in the Bank of
Uganda, a government bank, represents a huge barrier to resources’ disbursement. 14 The law establishes
mandatory registration procedures, including recommendations from governmental representatives, and
penalties for conducting activities through unregistered organizations. I.e., NGOs must cooperate with
local councils and relevant district committees to be able to carry on their ordinary duties. Regulation 13
of the NGO Registration Regulations 2009 states that an organization in carrying out its operations shall
comply with the requirement of not having any direct contact with the people in the area of operation
unless it has given seven days’ notice in writing of its intention to the local councils and Resident District
Commissioners of the area.
We instrument the presence of aid in a specific county with the distance of the county from the
district committee.
Fig. 3. Geolocalized District committee in Uganda.
Notes: In the map we draw only the district committees of the counties included in our dataset.
In particular, we employ as instrument the logarithm of the distance of each county from the
committee belonging to the same district of the county itself. We impose that if the county contains
the district committee the instrument takes value 0, otherwise it equals the logarithm of the distance
14See http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/uganda.html.
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plus one. To be consistent, we need to exclude from the dataset all individuals that live in counties that
received funds committed before 2006. We thus select only foreign aid projects committed after the 2006
amendment to the legislation and compare trust of respondents in this specific sub-sample with trust of
those who did not receive funds. The selection reduces the sample to 985 observations.
Table 5 shows the results of the first and second stage of the instrumental variables estimation.
Throughout all the specifications, the distance from the district committee is significant in predicting the
e ect of foreign aid on trust on other people. In line with our conjecture, the sign of the coe cient on the
distance from the district committee is negative, i.e. the more a county is distant from the committee the
lower is the probability that the NGO belonging to that county obtains funds for their activities. Column
1 shows the result of the baseline regression, where we fit a two stage least square model with individual
controls, county and district level controls and fixed e ects for ethnicity. The marginal coe cient on
distance is equal to -3.23 and significant at five percent level. The second stage results, reported in the
bottom panel of Table 5, are also in line with our conjecture: the sign on the variable dummy fund is
positive, as expected. Furthermore, the component of the dummy fund variable predicted by the distance
is equal to 0.379 and significant at one percent level. In column 2 and 3, we increase the complexity of
the model, adding region fixed e ects (column 2) and religion fixed e ects (column 3). In both cases,
an increase in the logarithm of the distance from the district committee is associated with a negative
probability of receiving foreign aid, corresponding to a marginal coe cient of -3.74, significant at the
one percent level. The second stage results show again a positive causal e ect of the component of the
dummy fund variable predicted by the distance on trust in other people. The coe cients estimates are
quite stable (0.340 in column 2 and 0.374 in column 3) and significant at the one percent level. Estimates
in the last two columns of Table 5 pass the F-test for exogeneity. Overall, the instrumental variables
analysis confirms that foreign aid represents a positive shock on individual trust on other people.
5 Foreign aid, inequality and trust
A number of papers studied the correlation between social capital, as measured by trust, and various
measures of inequality, finding a significant linkage between them. According to Alesina and Ferrara [4],
living in a community with a high degree of income disparity, i.e. high level of Gini coe cient, is strongly
associated with low trust. They find evidence of this e ect in a sample of individuals from American
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localities. Uslaner and Brown [31] explain the linkage between trust and inequality. According to the
authors, where inequality is high, people are less likely to believe that the future looks bright, and this is
reflected also in trust in other people. Thus, a possible explanation to our finding is that receiving foreign
aid induces a decrease in the level of inequality inside the county and this in turn a ects trust in other
people. This could happen given that one of the objectives of foreign aid is to provide or improve public
goods, such as roads, or public services. Living in an improved environment could then have an e ect on
perceived inequality and on trust.
In this section we follow this strand of the literature and study whether inequality could be a channel
through which aid a ects trust. We exploit a question from Afrobarometer, where individuals are asked to
compare their living condition with respect to other Ugandans. Using individuals’ answer to this question,
we create a dummy measure of perceived equality. The variable in the survey can assume 5 values,
depending on whether the individual feels that his living condition are "much worse", "worse", "same",
"better", "much better" than that of other Ugandans. We code the variable as 1 if the individual feels his
living condition equal to other Ugandans, and zero in all the other cases. We control for the same variable
estimated in 2008 averaged at county level to measure the shift from the average perceived inequality
during previous wave. Results in Table 6 show that when a county received foreign aid, the likelihood
that residents in that county feel more equal increase of 11% (column 1). This result is significant at 1%
level and robust to several demographic and fixed-e ect controls on region and agency. It is interesting
to notice that the magnitude of the coe cient is similar to the one associated to trust in column 1 of
Table 2. Columns 2-4 fit di erent fixed e ects on sectors, ethnic origin and religion, and the result is
always positive and significant at least at 5% level.
Figure 4 reports the results from the rolling-window regressions using the main specification and
where we control for past level of trust, individual and geographic controls, and sectorial fixed e ects. The
x-axis shows the di erence between individual perceived equality and the county’s average of perceived
equality from Afrobarometer 4. The dependent variable is a dummy taking value 1 if the individual shows
generalized trust, and 0 otherwise. The blue line shows the coe cient estimates for the natural log of
foreign aid received (ln fund) by the county while the red lines are the 5-percent confidence intervals. As
it is possible to notice, when the equality perceived with respect to previous wave is low, the coe cients
estimated are not significative. Increasing the equality perceived with respect to previous wave, the
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Fig. 4. Evolution of the coe cients on the presence of aid (dummy fund) in rolling regressions (probit model)
ordered by increasing equality perceived with respect to previous wave
Note: The figure reports the result from the rolling-windows regressions, where the window includes 900 observations.
The x-axis shows the di erence between individual perceived equality and the county’s average of perceived equality from
Afrobarometer 4. The dependent variable is a dummy taking value 1 if the individual shows generalized trust, and 0
otherwise. The blue line shows the coe cient estimates for the presence of fund (dummy fund) in the county while the
red lines are the 5-percent confdence intervals.
Fig. 5. Evolution of the coe cients on the quantity of aid (ln fund) in rolling regressions (probit model) ordered
by increasing equality perceived with respect to previous wave
Note: The figure reports the result from the rolling-windows regressions, where the window includes 850 observations.
The x-axis shows the di erence between individual perceived equality and the county’s average of perceived equality from
Afrobarometer 4. The dependent variable is a dummy taking value 1 if the individual shows generalized trust, and 0
otherwise. The blue line shows the coe cient estimates for the natural log of foreign aid received (ln fund) by the county
while the red lines are the 5-percent confdence intervals.
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coe cient associated to the presence of fund becomes positive and significant.15 This gives support to the
hypothesis that trust and inequality are strictly linked, and the last one could be a channel for the e ect
of foreign aid on trust. Figure 5 shows the result of the same type of analysis when the rolling estimation
is conducted using the natural log of foreign aid received in the county. Also in this case, for lower level of
equality perceived with respect to previous wave the coe cients estimated are not significative. Then, for
higher level of equality perceived, an increase in 1% in foreign aid seems to contribute linearly to the trust
in other people. The findings of this section confirm the close link among aid, inequality, and trust.
6 Robustness check
Up to this point, we have studied whether large disbursement of aid contributed to reduce the trust
deficit over time using di erent specification and addressing exogeneity issues through an appropriate
instrument. In this section, we run some empirical tests to check the robustness of our hypothesis. In
Table 9, we conduct the same instrumental strategy investigation as in Table 5 using the sample of aid
committed before 2006. We test whether distance predicts foreign aid committed prior to the enforcement
of the NGO’s registration act, to check for spurious correlation between foreign aid and distance in
general. Based on the results in Table 9, we can easily dismiss the possibility of having detected a spurious
correlation: distance has a positive e ect on foreign aid committed before 2006, unlike what we have
detected in Table 5. We might infer that 2006 represented a breaking point in our analysis, mainly due
to the enforcement of the NGO’s registration act. Looking at the F test, we can exclude that distance
is a good instrument for predicting foreign aid committed before 2006 and this supports once more our
conjecture.
In Table 10, we run di erent instrumental probit models and the results are robust and in line with
those in Table 5. As Table 10 shows, higher distance from the district committee is always associated with
higher probability of getting aid, and the probability of obtaining aid is positively associated with higher
trust in other people. In column 1 to 3 of Table 10, we include the same controls employed in Table 5:
results are consistent and independent from the model’s specification.
In Table 11, we collapse the data at county level and run a probit model employing only county and
district levels’ regressors. Although the number of observations in this case is extremely low and thus
15we identify a cut-o  point when the value of the shift in equality is equal to -0.17.
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any inference must be drawn with caution, the presence of aid in a county (dummy fund) remains again
statistically significant. The positive and significant marginal coe cient reported in column 1 of Table 11
comes from a model in which we control for the average level of trust in 2008. In column 2, we control
for other demographic and economic characteristics of the county, such as nightlight, unemployment
and all the other county level controls included in Table 2. The e ect of the main explanatory variable
becomes stronger when we include additional controls: the coe cient now takes a value of 0.711 and is
significant at five percent level. Finally, in column 3 we control for ethnic fragmentation and for slave
trade, employing the variables developed by Nunn and Wantchekon [26]. Again, the coe cient on aid is
positive and significant, with a marginal value equal to 0.865.
In Table 12, we study the e ect of foreign aid on other dimensions of trust, in particular trust on
relatives, on neighbors, and on other known people. The presence of foreign aid has almost no e ect on
other dimensions of trust, with the exception of a slightly positive e ect in the two stage least squares
regression with trust on neighbors. In general, we conclude that foreign aid has an extremely significant
e ect only on generalized trust, without a ecting the other dimensions of trust.
Considering the recent history of Uganda, there is an additional possible explanation to our results
on aid and trust, that is related to the occurrence of civil conflicts. Both aid and trust might be correlated
with the past experience of fighting in a specific county. In their recent work Rohner et al. [29] highlight
the importance of civil conflict in determining the level of social capital and trust in Uganda from a
long term perspective. They show how people living in counties that experienced conflicts report lower
levels of trust, compared to people that never experienced conflicts. Following this reasoning, it might be
interesting to study whether and how foreign aid mitigate the legacy of past conflicts on today levels of
trust. Indeed, if the availability of aid resources on a number of projects has also the potential to reduce
the disrupting e ects on trust of past conflicts thus accelerating the process of rebuilding trust, we could
conclude that foreign aid has a wider role in similar situations than just enhancing economic growth. As
an extension of the core analysis of the paper, in Table 7 we fit the same specification of Table 2 adding
as regressor the variable All fighting, taken from Rohner et al. [29]. This variable counts all the conflicts
that occurred in a county from 2000 to 2008, a period characterized by a high incidence of conflict in
Uganda, especially in the north of the country, where a rebel movement called Lord’s Resistance Army
was operating.16
16See Rohner et al. [29] for an extensive overview of the situation of conflict in Uganda.
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In column 1 of Table 7, we fit the baseline model using All fighting as explanatory variable and
excluding the dummy on the presence of foreign aid. The number of fighting that occurred until 2008 has
a negative e ect on long-term trust, but this e ect is statistically significant at ten percent level only in
column 2 where we control for ethnic fixed e ects. When we include in the model the dummy for aid, we
find that All fighting continues to be barely significant and the sign becomes quite unstable (see column
3-6). Conversely, the dummy on the presence of fund is significant at one percent level and the estimates
are similar to those in Table 2 in terms of magnitude.
The results in Table 7 could be driven by a high correlation between the localization of foreign aid
and that of conflict. Indeed, it might happen that NGOs develop projects in counties with records of
violent conflicts and such eventuality would drive our result, delivering non significant coe cients for
the proxy of conflicts. In order to test this hypothesis, in Table 8 we collapse the data at county level
and fit a probit model in which we regress the dummy for the presence of foreign aid on the number
of conflicts that occurred between 2000 and 2008 (column 1). In column 2, we add several county and
district level controls, and in column 3 we include controls on ethnic fractionalizations and the logarithm
of the quantity of slaves exported historically. Throughout all the specifications, we find no relevant e ect
of fighting on the presence of foreign aid (dummy fund).
7 Conclusion
Is there a linkage between foreign aid and trust? In this study we hypothesize that the disbursement
of funds through the financing of foreign aid initiatives by donors, represents a positive contemporaneous
shock that changes beliefs and social capital, and increases trust on other people. To test our hypothesis,
we use data from two waves of Afrobarometer survey and from AidData to examine whether individuals
living in counties that received more aid in the last decade are more trusting of others today.
In the first part of the analysis we implement a probit model and we find that an individual who
lives in a county recipient of foreign aid, has an higher probability of trusting other people compared to
one living in a county that did not receive foreign aid. The coe cient associated with the presence of a
project tells us that the marginal probability at mean value of the other variables is equal to 13 percent
and significant at one percent level. Our finding holds also at the extensive margin, where a rise of one
percent in foreign aid is associated with an increase of one percent in the probability of trusting other
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people. The findings are robust to controlling for the previous level of trust in the county, individual, local,
ethnic, and religion characteristics. However, an agency could decide to allocate foreign aid in a county
where there is more probability of success for the project, and in this case our result could be driven
by reverse causality. In order to overcome the reverse causality issue, we implement an instrumental
variable strategy exploiting the NGO Registration Act of 2006, a restrictive legislation that disciplines the
ordinary activity of NGOs in Uganda and that entered into force in 2006. Excluding the aid committed
before 2006 and employing as instrument the logarithm of the distance between a county and its district
committee, we assess the causal e ect of foreign aid on trust. The magnitude of the result is higher than
in the previous case, an individual living in a county recipient of foreign aid has a 37.9% higher probability
of trusting other people than someone living in a county not recipient of foreign aid. However, the shift in
magnitude could be caused by the implementation of a linear probability 2SLS model.
Following Bourdieu [7], social capital is an attribute of an individual in a social context; one
can acquire social capital through purposeful action and can transform social capital into conventional
economic gains.’ Our study supports the hypothesis that, independently from the long-debated issue
between foreign aid and growth, foreign aid has an impact on trust, that is commonly considered as a
proxy of social capital. Previous literature on aid was not able to capture the short-term growth e ect,
and in some cases, as Burnside and Dollar [9], found a positive relationship between foreign aid and
growth conditional on good policies. Conversely, our analysis is the first that suggests how foreign aid has
a significant e ect on social dimensions that, following Bourdieu [7] definition, could be converted into
conventional economic gains in the future.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
Foreign aid=0 Foreign aid=1
N mean sd N mean sd
Individual-level
Urban/Rural dummy 413 0.920 0.268 1699 0.822 0.383
Access to electricity 413 0.445 0.498 1699 0.427 0.495
Access to piped water system 413 0.290 0.455 1699 0.313 0.464
Access to sewage system 413 0.058 0.234 1699 0.174 0.380
Cell phone service 413 0.961 0.193 1699 0.896 0.305
Access to school 413 0.903 0.296 1699 0.883 0.322
Radio 413 0.789 0.408 1698 0.813 0.390
Television 412 0.085 0.279 1696 0.163 0.369
Vehicle 413 0.082 0.275 1699 0.101 0.302
Age 408 36.74 13.60 1693 34.88 12.76
Age2 408 1534.6 1222.4 1693 1379.4 1080.8
No and not looking for employment 413 0.301 0.463 1699 0.257 0.437
Unemployed 413 0.225 0.418 1699 0.247 0.431
Part-time employed 413 0.230 0.421 1699 0.232 0.422
Full-time employed 413 0.235 0.424 1699 0.263 0.440
High education 413 0.092 0.289 1699 0.131 0.338
Medium education 413 0.494 0.500 1699 0.505 0.500
Low education 413 0.414 0.493 1699 0.363 0.481
Sex 413 0.499 0.500 1699 0.501 0.500
County and district-level
Trust relatives 2008 413 0.843 0.110 1699 0.844 0.119
Trust in known people 2008 413 0.575 0.216 1699 0.529 0.190
Trust in others 2008 413 0.356 0.252 1699 0.312 0.219
Population size (2002) 413 506735 223645 1699 558819 298867
Urbanization 413 7.301 4.902 1699 15.01 26.23
Net Migration (in 1000) 413 -2.197 5.07 1699 0.155 5.61
Age dependency ratio 413 116.48 10.40 1699 109.69 16.17
Adjusted Fertility Rate 413 7.312 0.628 1699 6.923 1.02
Manufacturing Share 413 2.034 1.742 1699 2.38 2.01
Subsistence farming 413 24.84 10.47 1699 31.143 23.15
Unemployment share 413 4.085 1.639 1699 4.628 3.379
Number of Micro Enterprise 413 22590 11680 1699 30382 25134
Ethnic fragmentation 413 0.202 0.237 1699 0.116 0.173
Satellite nightlight per capita 413 0.131 0.183 1699 0.812 1.880
Ethnic-level
Slave export area (ln) 413 0.0319 0.042 1699 0.031 0.052
Hunting 377 .692 0.615 1595 0.869 0.470
Fishing 377 0.745 0.818 1595 0.727 0.835
Animal Husbandry 377 2.541 1.093 1595 2.515 1.168
Agriculture 377 5.94 0.682 1595 5.774 0.823
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Table 2. Foreign aid and trust - extensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dummy Fund 0.114*** 0.133*** 0.132*** 0.113**
(0.029) (0.037) (0.045) (0.045)
Agency FE Y Y Y Y
Sector FE N Y Y Y
Ethnic FE N N Y Y
Religion FE N N N Y
Region FE Y Y Y Y
Pseudo-R2 0.1335 0.1432 0.1461 0.1589
Observations 1,845 1,845 1,721 1,697
County-religion clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Note: The table reports marginal e ects obtained through a Probit model. The dependent variable is a dummy taking
value 1 if the individual shows generalized trust, and 0 otherwise. All the specifications (columns 1 to 4) include the
following set of controls: a vector of demographic characteristics (age and its square, employment status, and educational
level), a vector of social characteristics (population size, possession of radio, television, and vehicles, whether the county
is rural or urban, access to electricity, piped water, sewage system, cell phone services and availability of schools), the
average level generalized trust in 2008 by county, the previous level of trust in own group, urbanization, age-dependency
ratio, share of manufacture, share of subsistence farming, net migration, number of micro-enterprises, adjusted total
fertility rate, unemployment rate, and county characteristics (ethnic fractionalization, nightlight), fixed-e ects on agencies
and regions.
Table 3. Other control variables and trust - marginal coe cients.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln of Population -0.054 -0.025 -0.232*** -236***
(0.039) (0.042) (0.066) (0.066)
Urban dummy -0.033 -0.031 -0.07 -0.07
(0.042) (0.044) (0.048) (0.048)
Unemployment level 2008 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Dummy employment -0.040** -0.041** -0.042** -0.039**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Satellite nightlight percapita 2008 0.175*** 0.219*** 0.263*** 0.269***
(0.040) (0.046) (0.054) (0.053)
County-religion clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: The table reports the marginal e ects of other control variables from the specification reported in Table 2.
Specifications in column 1-4 correspond to those fitted in column 1-4 of Table 2. The dependent variable is a dummy
taking value 1 if the individual shows generalized trust, and 0 otherwise. All the specifications (columns 1 to 4) include the
following set of controls: a vector of demographic characteristics (age and its square, employment status, and educational
level), a vector of social characteristics (population size, possession of radio, television, and vehicles, whether the county
is rural or urban, access to electricity, piped water, sewage system, cell phone services and availability of schools), the
average level generalized trust in 2008, the previous level of trust in own group, urbanization, age-dependency ratio, share
of manufacture, share of subsistence farming, net migration, number of micro-enterprises, adjusted total fertility rate,
unemployment rate, and county characteristics (ethnic fractionalization, nightlight), fixed-e ects on agencies and regions.
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Table 4. Foreign aid and trust - intensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln fund 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.0076***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Agency FE Y Y Y Y
Sector FE N Y Y Y
Ethnic FE N N Y Y
Religion FE N N N Y
Region FE Y Y Y Y
Pseudo-R2 0.1340 0.1446 0.1470 0.1485
Observations 1,845 1,845 1,721 1,697
County-religion clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: The table reports marginal e ects obtained through a Probit model. The dependent variable is a dummy taking
value 1 if the individual shows generalized trust, and 0 otherwise. For the set of controls see note below Table 2.
Table 5. Two stage least square estimation using ln of the distance from district committee as instrument for the
presence of fund
First stage regression
ln(distance+1) from district committee -3.23** -3.74*** -3.74***
(1.21) (1.13) (1.11)
Individual controls Y Y Y
County/Districts-level controls Y Y Y
Fixed E ects Ethnic Ethnic, Regions Ethnic, Regions, Religion
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 7.09 10.93 11.29
R2 0.49 0.54 0.54
Second stage regression
Dummy fund 0.379*** 0.340*** 0.374***
(0.134) (0.091) (0.098)
Individual controls Y Y Y
County/Districts-level controls Y Y Y
Fixed E ects Ethnic Ethnic, Regions Ethnic, Regions, Religion
Errors clustered County & Religion County & Religion County & Religion
R2 0.07 0.09 0.09
Observations 985 985 985
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: model applied is a a 2 stage least square with trust (dummy 0-1) as dependent variable at individual level and the
ratio between average county’s distance from all the o ces of Bank of Uganda on the county’s area. All the specifications
include demographic controls (age and age-squared, employment status, and educational level) social controls (population
size radio/television/vehicle possession, urban/rural dummy, access to electricity, piped water, sewage system, cell phone
services and school); generalized trust in 2008 by county, past trust in own group, urbanization, age-dependency ratio,
share of manufacture, share of subsistence farming, net migration, number of micro-enterprises, adjusted total fertility
rate,unemployment rate), and county characteristics, fixed-e ects on agency.
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Table 6. Foreign aid and perceived equality - extensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dummy Fund 0.111*** 0.099*** 0.064** 0.058**
(0.042) (0.035) (0.026) (0.026)
Agency FE Y N N N
Sector FE N Y N N
Ethnic FE N N Y N
Religion FE N N N Y
Region FE Y Y Y Y
Pseudo-R2 0.063 0.053 0.048 0.058
Observations 1,647 1,657 1,657 1,638
County-religion clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: The table reports the marginal e ects obtained through a Probit model. The dependent variable is a dummy taking
value 1 if the individual feels equal with others in term of living condition, and 0 otherwise. All the specifications (columns
1 to 4) include the following set of controls: a vector of demographic characteristics (age and its square, employment
status, and educational level), a vector of social characteristics (population size, possession of radio, television, and
vehicles, whether the county is rural or urban, access to electricity, piped water, sewage system, cell phone services and
availability of schools), the average level of perceived equality in 2008 averaged by county, urbanization, age-dependency
ratio, share of manufacture, share of subsistence farming, net migration, number of micro-enterprises, adjusted total
fertility rate, unemployment rate, and county characteristics (ethnic fractionalization, nightlight), fixed-e ects on agencies
and regions.
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Table 7. Foreign aid, trust and conflict- Extensive Margin robustness check
(1) (2) (1) (2) (3) (4)
All fighting -1.903 -3.667* -0.212 1.371 2.047 - 0.460
(1.885) (2.231) (1.548) (1.538) (1.067) (0.762)
Dummy Fund 0.572*** 0.728*** 0.685*** 0.536***
(0.089) (0.146) (0.232) (0.150)
Agency FE N N Y Y Y Y
Sector FE N N N Y Y Y
Ethnic FE N Y N N Y Y
Religion FE N N N N N Y
Region FE Y N Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,979 1,853 1,877 1,877 1,721 1,825
Region-clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Note: The table reports Probit estimates. The dependent variable is a dummy taking value 1 if the individual shows
generalized trust, and 0 otherwise. All the specifications (columns 1 to 4) include the following set of controls: a
vector of demographic characteristics (age and its square, employment status, and educational level), a vector of social
characteristics (population size, possession of radio, television, and vehicles, whether the county is rural or urban, access to
electricity, piped water, sewage system, cell phone services and availability of schools), the average level generalized trust
in 2008 by county, the previous level of trust in own group, urbanization, age-dependency ratio, share of manufacture,
share of subsistence farming, net migration, number of micro-enterprises, adjusted total fertility rate, unemployment rate,
and county characteristics (ethnic fractionalization, nightlight), fixed-e ects on agencies and regions.
Table 8. Foreign aid and conflict - investigation on the determinants of foreign aid
(1) (2) (3)
All fighting 2.162 0.942 -.037
(4.620) (6.056) (6.639)
County/Districts-level controls N Y Y
Historical ethnic controls (Nunn) N N Y
Errors clustered District District District
Observations 98 98 98
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Note: model applied is a a probit with the presence of foreign aid (dummy fund) in the county as dependent variable.
The second specification adds county demographic and economics controls. The third specification includes also control
on ln of slave exported historically and ethnic fractionalization. Errors are robust and clustered at county level.
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Table 9. Robustness check on foreign aid committed before 2006
First stage regression
ln(distance+1) from district committee 1.23** 1.21** 1.23**
(0.52) (0.51) (0.52)
Individual controls Y Y Y
County/Districts-level controls Y Y Y
Fixed E ects Ethnic Ethnic, Regions Ethnic, Regions, Religion
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 5.64 5.65 5.62
Second stage regression
Dummy fund 0.146 0.139 0.059
(0.259) (0.314) (0.276)
Individual controls Y Y Y
County/Districts-level controls Y Y Y
Fixed E ects Ethnic Ethnic, Regions Ethnic, Regions, Religion
Errors clustered County & Religion County & Religion County & Religion
Observations 1046 1046 1046
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Note: model applied is a a 2 stage least square with trust (dummy 0-1) as dependent variable at individual level and the
ratio between average county’s distance from all the o ces of Bank of Uganda on the county’s area. All the specifications
include demographic controls (age and age-squared, employment status, and educational level) social controls (population
size radio/television/vehicle possession, urban/rural dummy, access to electricity, piped water, sewage system, cell phone
services and school); generalized trust in 2008 by county, past trust in own group, urbanization, age-dependency ratio,
share of manufacture, share of subsistence farming, net migration, number of micro-enterprises, adjusted total fertility
rate,unemployment rate), and county characteristics, fixed-e ects on agency.
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Table 10. Instrumental Probit estimation using ln of the distance from district committee as instrument for the
presence of fund
First stage regression
ln(distance+1) from district commitee -3.66** -1.14** -4.03***
(1.65) (0.55) (1.50)
Individual controls Y Y Y
County/Districts-level controls Y Y Y
Fixed E ects Ethnic Ethnic, Regions Ethnic, Regions, Religion
Prob > chi2 0.048 0.019 0.014
Second stage regression
Dummy fund 1.60*** 1.52*** 1.71***
(0.536) (0.452) (0.459)
Individual controls Y Y Y
County/Districts-level controls Y Y Y
Fixed E ects Ethnic Ethnic, Regions Ethnic, Regions, Religion
Errors clustered County County County
Observations 875 875 847
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Note: model applied is a an istrumental probit with trust (dummy 0-1) as dependent variable at individual level and the
ratio between average county’s distance from all the o ces of Bank of Uganda on the county’s area. All the specifications
include demographic controls (age and age-squared, employment status, and educational level) social controls (population
size radio/television/vehicle possession, urban/rural dummy, access to electricity, piped water, sewage system, cell phone
services and school); generalized trust in 2008 by county, past trust in own group, urbanization, age-dependency ratio,
share of manufacture, share of subsistence farming, net migration, number of micro-enterprises, adjusted total fertility
rate,unemployment rate), and county characteristics, fixed-e ects on agency.
Table 11. Probit estimation of the e ect of fund on trust using the collapsed cross-county dataset
Dummy fund 0.593* 0.711** 0.865**
(0.306) (0.334) (0.349)
Trust level during 2008 Y Y Y
County/Districts-level controls N Y Y
Historical ethnic controls (Nunn) N N Y
Errors clustered District District District
Observations 98 98 98
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Note: model applied is a a probit with average trust in the county as dependent variable. All the specifications include
controls on generalized trust in 2008 by county as well as on trust on relatives and on known people during 2008. The
second specification adds county demographic and economics controls. The third specification includes also control on ln
of slave exported historically and ethnic fractionalization. Errors are robust and clustered at county level.
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Table 12. Probit and two stage least squares estimation of presence of fund on other dimension of trust (relative,
neighbor, otherpeople
Trust dimension relative relative neighbor neighbor otherpeopleknown otherpeopleknown
Probit 2SLS Probit 2SLS Probit 2SLS
dummy fund 0.145 -0.021 -0.140 0.608* -0.076 -0.165
(0.204) (0.193) (0.236) (0.192) (0.160) (0.132)
Agency FE Y N Y N Y N
R2 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.18
County-clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Note: Dependent variables are trust on relative, on neighbor, trust on other people. Model applied are a probit and 2sls
with trust (dummy 0-1) as dependent variable at individual level. All the specifications include demographic controls
(age and age-squared, employment status, and educational level) social controls (population size radio/television/vehicle
possession, urban/rural dummy, access to electricity, piped water, sewage system, cell phone services and school);
generalized trust in 2008 by county, past trust in own group, urbanization, age-dependency ratio, share of manufacture,
share of subsistence farming, net migration, number of micro-enterprises, adjusted total fertility rate,unemployment rate),
and county characteristics (ethnic fractionalization, nightlight), fixed-e ects on agency.
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Appendix 2
Table 13. List of agencies and sectors in the analysis - first part
Agency Name Primary sector
African Development Fund EDUCATION
African Development Fund WORKS AND TRANSPORT
African Development Fund|China|Sweden AGRICULTURE
ABEDA |Belgium|Germany|IDB |KFD|OPEC|SFD|South Korea EDUCATION




Austria TOURISM, TRADE AND INDUSTRY
China AGRICULTURE
China EDUCATION
China ENERGY AND MINERAL DEVELOPMENT
China HEALTH
China SECURITY
China TOURISM, TRADE AND INDUSTRY
China WORKS AND TRANSPORT
Denmark/DANIDA AGRICULTURE
Denmark/DANIDA SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT





European Union WORKS AND TRANSPORT
Germany ENERGY AND MINERAL DEVELOPMENT
Iceland EDUCATION
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ENERGY AND MINERAL DEVELOPMENT
IDA ENERGY AND MINERAL DEVELOPMENT
IDA HEALTH
IDA TOURISM, TRADE AND INDUSTRY
IDA WORKS AND TRANSPORT
IDA | ADF ENERGY AND MINERAL DEVELOPMENT
IDA |Japan WORKS AND TRANSPORT
IDA |Norway ENERGY AND MINERAL DEVELOPMENT
Ireland EDUCATION





Table 14. List of agencies and sectors in the analysis - second part
Agency Name Primary sector
Japan AGRICULTURE
Japan EDUCATION
Japan ENERGY AND MINERAL DEVELOPMENT
Japan HEALTH
Japan SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
Japan WORKS AND TRANSPORT
Norway AGRICULTURE|EDUCATION
Norway EDUCATION






Sweden TOURISM, TRADE AND INDUSTRY
Swedish International Development Authority HEALTH
United Kingdom HEALTH
United Kingdom SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
UNDP SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
United States of America AGRICULTURE
United States of America HEALTH
United States of America SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
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